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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the U.S. business cycle dynamics considering time-variations
and breaks predominantly associated with the Great Recession in the late 2000s.
In the first essay, I evaluate the predictive content of financial variables and unconven-
tional monetary policy measures for the U.S. output growth and inflation before, during,
and after the Great Recession from 1960–2015. I compare the local forecasting perfor-
mances of the variables with attention to the Great Recession period when the Federal
Reserve System and market participants were not able to use the federal funds rate for a
policy instrument and a leading indicator for the economy. This shows that the predictive
ability of the credit spread, stock price, and market expectation measures for output growth
and inflation change significantly increased during the Great Recession. The result is con-
sistent with the idea that the Great Recession was primarily driven by a financial shock,
and that financial condition measures might be useful indicators for the future economy to
investors and central bankers. Additionally, it is important that financial market conditions
are not exacerbated by a future economic shock to avoid a vicious cycle.
In the second essay, I examine how the conditional volatilities of the U.S. macroeco-
nomic variables have changed before and during the Great Recession considering condi-
tional mean changes. I implement multiple structural break tests in a reduced form model
to find structural changes in the volatilities and means of the variables using the data from
1960–2015. The test results show that the increase in the volatility in the economy dur-
ing the Great Recession was temporary, and there was no structural break in the growth
rate of GDP during the Great Recession. But, there was a structural break in the growth
rates of consumption variables, which are major parts of the economy, and demand-related
variables, such as real disposable income and liabilities of consumers. A simulation result
ii
suggests that a structural break in the growth rate of the economy might have occurred
before the Great Recession if the recent sluggish economy continues in the coming years.
This evidence suggests that the monetary policy in the period of the Great Moderation
might be reconsidered for the sustainable growth of the economy beyond the short-run,
and policy for improving the recent sluggish economy, especially consumption, might be
necessary to avoid a structural decline in the growth rate of the economy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This dissertation examines the U.S. business cycle dynamics—a short-term economic
fluctuation—mainly associated with the recent financial crisis, the Great Recession, which
happened in December 2007. The thesis includes two essays. The title of the first essay
is “Forecasting the U.S. Economy during the Great Recession: The Predictive Content of
Financial Condition Measures,” and the title of the second essay is “Examining the Great
Moderation during the Great Recession.”
The U.S. economy experienced an economic downturn starting in late 2007. Although
there were many recessions in the U.S. business cycle after the Great Depression occurred,
the recent crisis was more serious in depth, dispersion, and duration than any other reces-
sion. Also, the policy environment changed significantly after the crisis happened.
Since the mid-1980s, the monetary authority of the United States, the Federal Reserve
System (henceforth, Fed) had used an active monetary policy for stabilizing the economy
whenever there was an economic recession or a boom. At the same time, the U.S. econ-
omy also grew steadily without a serious recession during this period. Many economists
called this period the Great Moderation to express the declines of volatilities or uncertainty
in the economy, and they claimed that the success of monetary policy was one of the main
contributors to the Great Moderation. In this period, there was a downward trend in the
monetary policy instrument, and the federal funds rate. The issue of global imbalances,
such as high savings and current account surpluses in emerging markets and low savings
and high current account deficits in developed countries including the U.S., was not con-
sidered as a serious international economic problem among policy makers and economists.
However, after the crisis happened, the financial market was worsened seriously by
the declines of financial asset prices, especially in the housing market. The problem in
1
the financial market dispersed into the entire economy, and the U.S. economy fell into a
serious recession. To address the crisis, the Fed lowered the federal funds rate to near
zero percent. As a result, the Fed was not able to use the conventional monetary policy—
adjusting the federal funds rate—anymore due to the zero lower bound constraint. Instead,
the Fed started to implement an emergency policy and an unconventional monetary policy.
The Great Recession ended in June 2009 according to an announcement from the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). However, its influences on the economy
and policy making are still an ongoing issue in economics. For example, the U.S. econ-
omy is sluggishly recovering after the Great Recession, the federal funds rate is still low
meaning that the Fed could not lower it fully in a future recession, and some economists
and policy makers have doubts about the previous accommodative monetary policy and
the global imbalances due to the fear of another financial bubble or crisis.
In this thesis, I aim to understand the changes in the U.S. business cycle focusing on
the Great Recession period because we can learn about the U.S. business cycle from this
serious crisis when many new policies were implemented and its effects on the economy
still exist. In the first essay, I evaluate the forecasting performances of various finan-
cial variables and unconventional monetary policy measures before, during, and after the
Great Recession. I pay attention to the period of the Great Recession when the Fed was
not able to use the federal funds rate, which had given information about the future econ-
omy to market participants including central bankers and investors. In the second essay,
I implement structural break tests on the conditional volatilities and means of the U.S.
macroeconomic variables to test whether there were structural breaks in the U.S. economy
before and during the crisis. This analysis could provide information about the current
business cycle to policy makers and economists for developing better policy and research.
2
1.1 Introduction to the First Essay
In forecasting output growth and inflation, central banks give considerable signifi-
cance to asset prices and money aggregates. Central bankers presume that asset prices
and money aggregates contain forward-looking information about the economic climate.
This includes information about the real interest rate and expected inflation, according to
the Fisher equation that the nominal interst rate equals the real interest rate plus the ex-
pected rate of inflation and the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970). Various asset
prices and money aggregates react to monetary policy and diverse shocks in the economy
(Mishkin, 2001). Furthermore, a central bank principally implements monetary policy for
its policy objective by using its granted power to issue currency.
Numerous researchers have studied the predictive content of asset prices and money
aggregates for forecasting economic activity and inflation. Friedman and Schwartz (1963)
state that the money stock predicted nominal income well from 1867-1960. Bernanke and
Blinder (1992) suggest that the federal funds rate was informative about the future move-
ment of real activity measures from 1959 to 1989 because it captured monetary policy
actions. Friedman and Kuttner (1993) suggest that the paper-bill spread has the predictive
content for real activity because it reflects the default risk change and the imperfect substi-
tutability between the paper and bill. Estrella and Trubin (2006) claim that the term spread
between Treasury securities is a good predictor of recessions because the yield curve of
U.S. Treasuries captures the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve and economic condi-
tions well.
The literature also points out, however, that a change in the economy may influence the
forecasting performances of indicators. Lucas (1976) points out that a policy change could
alter the accuracy of existing econometric models because people adapt their behavior to
new situations. The Federal Reserve System has, over time, changed its target variables
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and indicators (Meulendyke, 1998). Stock and Watson (2003a) and Rossi and Sekhposyan
(2010) show that the forecasting performances of asset prices declined during the period
of the Great Moderation. Ng and Wright (2013) provide empirical evidence that the credit
spread became more informative for forecasting real GDP change during the financial
crisis.
One important issue for researchers and policy makers has been forecasting the perfor-
mance of financial variables during a financial crisis. Bagehot (1888) emphasizes the im-
portance of maintaining an adequate banking reserve—a gold reserve—and issuing bank
notes by the Bank of England, instead of allowing gold withdrawal by depositors in a
financial crisis to improve market confidence. Friedman and Schwartz (1963) point out
that, during the Great Depression, the Fed failed to control the amount of money stock.
Bernanke (1983) claims that, also during the Great depression, another important compo-
nent besides the money stock was the nonmonetary policy effect, such as the credit spread
between safe assets and risk assets. Bernanke et al. (1999, 2007); Gilchrist and Zakrajšek
(2012) suggest that financial conditions have predictive content for the economy through
the financial accelerator mechanism.
The monetary policy environment in the U.S. changed following the beginning of the
Great Recession.1 Before the crisis, the Federal Reserve System intervened primarily in
the short-term Treasury bill market by targeting the federal funds rate. However, after the
crisis began, the Fed implemented a more active monetary policy to address “the unusual
and exigent circumstances” by implementing Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act.
This was because the financial market conditions failed to recover even after the federal
funds rate dropped to near zero percent, and the economy was getting worse rapidly. The
stock prices (S&P 500) fell from 1,565.15 on October 9, 2007 to 676.53 on March 9, 2009.
1According to business cycle reference dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the
Great Recession started in December 2007 and ended in June 2009.
4
The real GDP growth also declined to -2.8 in 2009, and the unemployment rate increased
from 4.7% in November 2007 to 10.0% in October 2009. The financial crisis tipped the
economy into the Great Recession.
The Fed commenced implementing various unconventional monetary policies: ex-
panding the Fed’s balance sheet, changing the composition of the balance sheet, and im-
plementing forward guidance.2 With respect to changes in financial regulation, the Dodd-
Frank Act was enacted in July 2010, and Basel III was introduced after the recession.
The motivations for this study are the Great Recession and the consequent policy en-
vironment change. I evaluate the predictive content of asset prices, money aggregates,
lending measures, composite leading indicators, and surveys for forecasting output growth
and inflation before, during, and after the Great Recession. I take a particular look at the
credit spread, the size of the Fed’s balance sheet, and the expectation measures that have
potentially become more important in the context of the unconventional monetary policy
environment.
1.2 Introduction to the Second Essay
After the Great Recession began in 2007,3 severe fluctuations appeared in U.S. macroe-
conomic variables, such as the growth rate of GDP and the unemployment rate. Compared
to previous recessionary periods, the Great Recession was larger, longer and more exten-
sive. The volatility4 of real GDP can be seen in Figure 1.1, and the increased variances of
the unemployment rate can be seen in Figure 1.2. Table 1.1 compares the recessions of the
post-World War II era.
2For more details, see Bernanke (2009).
3According to the business cycle reference dates of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER),
the Great Recession started in December 2007 and ended in June 2009.
4Volatility is measured by the standard deviation from the mean.
5
Figure 1.1: GDP Growth Rates
Notes: GDP growth rates are calculated by ln(GDPt/GDPt−1).
Figure 1.2: Unemployment Rate Changes
Notes: Unemployment rate changes are calculated by (Unemploymentt − Unemploymentt−1).
6
Ta
bl
e
1.
1:
R
ec
es
si
on
s
in
th
e
Po
st
-W
or
ld
W
ar
II
E
ra
D
at
e(
Q
ua
rt
er
)
M
on
th
s
C
on
tr
ac
tio
n
M
ax
.
C
on
tr
ac
tio
n
of
G
D
P
U
ne
m
p
R
at
e
of
IP
N
ov
.1
94
8(
IV
)-
O
ct
.1
94
9(
IV
)
11
1.
7%
7.
9%
10
.3
%
Ju
l.
19
53
(I
I)
-
M
ay
19
54
(I
I)
10
2.
6
6.
1
10
.0
A
ug
.1
95
7(
II
I)
-A
pr
.1
95
8(
II
)
8
3.
7
7.
5
13
.6
A
pr
.1
96
0(
II
)-
Fe
b.
19
61
(I
)
10
1.
4
7.
1
9.
0
D
ec
.1
96
9(
IV
)-
N
ov
.1
97
0(
IV
)
11
0.
6
6.
1
7.
2
N
ov
.1
97
3(
IV
)-
M
ar
.1
97
5(
I)
16
3.
2
9.
0
14
.0
Ja
n.
19
80
(I
)-
Ju
l.
19
80
(I
II
)
6
2.
2
7.
8
6.
9
Ju
l.
19
81
(I
II
)-
N
ov
.1
98
2(
IV
)
16
2.
9
10
.8
9.
7
Ju
l.
19
90
(I
II
)-
M
ar
.1
99
1(
I)
8
1.
3
7.
8
4.
3
M
ar
.2
00
1(
I)
-
N
ov
.2
00
1(
IV
)
8
0.
3
6.
3
5.
7
D
ec
.2
00
7(
IV
)-
Ju
n.
20
09
(I
I)
18
4.
3
10
.0
19
.0
N
ot
es
:
R
ec
es
si
on
da
te
s
ar
e
fr
om
th
e
N
at
io
na
lB
ur
ea
u
of
E
co
no
m
ic
R
es
ea
rc
h
an
d
N
at
io
na
lI
nc
om
e
an
d
Pr
od
uc
tA
cc
ou
nt
s,
an
d
da
ta
ar
e
fr
om
th
e
Fe
de
ra
lR
es
er
ve
B
an
k
of
St
.
L
ou
is
.
T
he
co
nt
ra
ct
io
n
of
G
D
P
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
us
in
g
qu
ar
te
rl
y
da
ta
,a
nd
th
e
ot
he
rv
al
ue
s
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
us
in
g
m
on
th
ly
da
ta
.
7
Ta
bl
e
1.
2:
Su
m
m
ar
y
St
at
is
tic
s
fo
r2
4
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
Ti
m
e
Se
ri
es
,1
96
0:
I-
20
15
:I
I
Se
ri
es
m
ea
n
st
d
m
ea
n
st
d
m
ea
n
st
d
m
ea
n
st
d
19
60
:I
-2
01
5:
II
I
19
60
:I
-1
98
3:
IV
19
84
:I
-2
00
7:
II
I
20
07
:I
V
-2
01
5:
II
G
D
P
0.
75
0.
84
0.
86
1.
06
0.
80
0.
51
0.
30
0.
72
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
0.
81
0.
68
0.
91
0.
82
0.
86
0.
48
0.
35
0.
51
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n–
du
ra
bl
es
1.
31
2.
95
1.
30
3.
54
1.
49
2.
46
0.
79
2.
25
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n–
no
nd
ur
ab
le
s
0.
60
0.
72
0.
64
0.
84
0.
66
0.
59
0.
28
0.
64
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n–
se
rv
ic
es
0.
81
0.
47
0.
99
0.
49
0.
81
0.
36
0.
31
0.
35
In
ve
st
m
en
t(
to
ta
l)
0.
93
4.
06
1.
09
5.
09
1.
00
2.
65
0.
23
4.
10
Fi
xe
d
in
ve
st
m
en
t–
to
ta
l
0.
92
2.
17
1.
09
2.
53
1.
00
1.
47
0.
17
2.
63
N
on
re
si
de
nt
ia
l
1.
12
2.
08
1.
29
2.
27
1.
18
1.
69
0.
39
2.
46
R
es
id
en
tia
l
0.
39
4.
59
0.
59
5.
88
0.
51
2.
68
-0
.5
7
4.
73
∆
(i
nv
en
to
ry
in
ve
st
m
en
t)
/G
D
P
0.
51
0.
60
0.
70
0.
68
0.
43
0.
44
0.
16
0.
55
E
xp
or
ts
1.
42
3.
61
1.
42
4.
96
1.
64
1.
90
0.
76
2.
55
Im
po
rt
s
1.
39
3.
35
1.
40
4.
47
1.
72
1.
82
0.
37
2.
76
G
ov
er
nm
en
ts
pe
nd
in
g
0.
47
1.
01
0.
56
1.
19
0.
56
0.
81
-0
.0
6
0.
76
Pr
od
uc
tio
n
G
oo
ds
(t
ot
al
)
0.
93
1.
76
0.
96
2.
17
1.
01
1.
12
0.
62
1.
96
N
on
du
ra
bl
e
go
od
s
0.
65
1.
11
0.
71
1.
18
0.
56
0.
97
0.
71
1.
33
D
ur
ab
le
go
od
s
1.
17
2.
83
1.
23
3.
76
1.
31
1.
53
0.
55
2.
52
Se
rv
ic
es
0.
72
0.
48
0.
86
0.
56
0.
74
0.
33
0.
26
0.
25
St
ru
ct
ur
es
0.
36
2.
45
0.
55
2.
93
0.
44
1.
62
-0
.4
6
2.
80
N
on
ag
ri
cu
ltu
ra
le
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
44
0.
54
0.
56
0.
62
0.
43
0.
37
0.
09
0.
60
Pr
ic
e
in
fla
tio
n
(G
D
P
de
fla
to
r)
0.
00
0.
26
0.
00
0.
32
0.
00
0.
20
0.
00
0.
24
90
-d
ay
T-
bi
ll
ra
te
-0
.0
2
0.
73
0.
05
0.
99
-0
.0
5
0.
47
-0
.1
3
0.
35
10
-y
ea
rT
-b
on
d
ra
te
-0
.0
1
0.
48
0.
07
0.
52
-0
.0
7
0.
46
-0
.0
8
0.
36
N
ot
es
:
Su
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
tic
s
ar
e
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
th
e
tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n
co
de
in
th
e
ap
pe
nd
ix
.
N
IP
A
se
ri
es
ar
e
qu
ar
te
rl
y
%
ch
an
ge
s.
In
fla
tio
n
is
ca
lc
ul
at
ed
by
∆
2
lo
g
(x
t)
,
an
d
T-
bi
ll
an
d
T-
bo
nd
ar
e
th
e
fir
st
di
ff
er
en
ce
.
O
ut
pu
t
pe
r
ho
ur
an
d
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n
pe
r
ho
ur
ar
e
th
e
fir
st
lo
g
di
ff
er
en
ce
.I
us
ed
th
e
va
ri
ab
le
s
fr
om
St
oc
k
an
d
W
at
so
n
(2
00
3b
)a
nd
th
e
tr
an
sf
or
m
at
io
n
co
de
fr
om
M
cC
ra
ck
en
an
d
N
g
(2
01
5)
in
th
is
ta
bl
e.
8
Compared to previous recessions, the Great Recession brought on greater volatilities
for multiple economic variables. The changes of various macroeconomic time series in
volatilities can be seen in Table 1.2. Many researchers are studying this change, trying to
discern whether the increased volatilities are transitory or permanent.
Researchers have examined the characteristics of business cycles because understand-
ing the state of the economy is important to consumers, producers, and policy makers as
the economic growth and the volatility influence the standard of living, job creation, and
investment. In fact, the Great Recession has significantly impacted the incomes and job
statuses of many market participants. These participants have, in anticipation of the en-
suing economic changes, made decisions to maximize their utility. By the same token,
economists need to adjust their models according to economic conditions to obtain a pre-
cise analysis. For policy makers, if asset prices or volatility change irrationally away from
fundamental factors, as was the case, for example, before the Great Recession or during
the Great Recession, they should respond appropriately for the sake of financial and eco-
nomic stability (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999). For investors, high volatility is related to the
uncertainty5 of return and ambiguity aversion, and investors require higher risk premium
when market volatility is high.
Prior to the Great Recession, many researchers were paying attention to a decline in the
volatilities of US macroeconomic activities after the mid-1980s, a period referred to as “the
Great Moderation” (Stock and Watson, 2003b; Bernanke, 2004). During the Great Moder-
ation, the U.S. economy grew steadily without a serious recessionary period. McConnell
and Pérez-Quirós (2000) claim that the decline in the volatility of U.S. GDP growth was
attributed to the decline in the volatility of durable goods production from improved inven-
tory management, but Davis and Kahn (2008) provide empirical evidence that the Great
5Uncertainty can be divided into two categories: risk, which one can estimate own distribution of the
stochastic events, and Knightian uncertainty, which one cannot know the distributoin of future events. For
more discussion of the uncertainty, see Rossi et al. (2016)
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Moderation did not reduce economic uncertainty for micro level data as much as it did for
the uncertainty of macro level data. Bernanke (2004) suggests that there are three main
explanations for the Great Moderation–structural change, improved government policies,
and good luck. He claims that what contributed most to the Great Moderation was an im-
proved monetary policy. In contrast, Stock and Watson (2003b) claim that the decline of
volatilities was due to the good luck of smaller economic shocks.
Due to the declines of volatilities and moderate economic growth, consumers and pro-
ducers could make economic decisions under less uncertainty, and a government and a cen-
tral bank supported economic stabilization policies, particularly monetary policy. From the
early 1980s under the chrairmanships of Volcker and Greenspan, the monetary authority
intervened in the financial market aggressively to end the Great Inflation of the 1970s. The
Fed implemented expansionary monetary policy to stabilize the economy when there was
a financial crisis, such as Black Monday in 1987 and the dot-com bubble in 2001. Addi-
tionally, the Fed implemented contractionary monetary policy when there was inflationary
pressure in the economy. As a result, many researchers paid attention to stabilization poli-
cies and optimal monetary policies, such as a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993), by a monetary
authority.
During the Great Recession, though, the GDP growth rate and unemployment rate, as
noted above, fluctuated severely, and the U.S. economy experienced unprecedented eco-
nomic hardship after the Great Depression. As a result, many researchers have investigated
whether the Great Moderation is over not only because it is important to assess volatility
of the economy per se but also it broke the belief among policy makers and researchers
about the success of stabilization policy by a monetary authority.
How the present state of the economy is understood varies among researchers. Ng and
Tambalotti (2012) and Canarella et al. (2008), using a forecasting analysis, state that the
Great Moderation is over. However, Gadea Rivas et al. (2014) using real U.S. GDP data
10
from 1953 to 2013, suggest that the Great Moderation continues.
By closely examining numerous macroeconomic variables, this study differs from pre-
vious literature as it provides comprehensive empirical evidence of whether the Great
Moderation is over or not. Its aim is to identify a hidden trend associated with the Great
Recession besides the break of the Great Moderation.
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2. FORECASTING THE U.S. ECONOMY DURING THE GREAT RECESSION:
THE PREDICTIVE CONTENT OF FINANCIAL CONDITION MEASURES
Section 2 is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the data; Section 2.2 intro-
duces the model. In Section 2.3, I discuss the statistical tests, and Section 2.4 shows the
estimation results. Finally, Section 2.5 shows the robustness.
2.1 Data
A subset of the explanatory variables chosen by Stock and Watson (2003a) is consid-
ered. As candidate variables for reflecting the unconventional monetary policy environ-
ment, I also include credit spreads (Bernanke, 1983, 1990), surveys for measuring market
expectations (Krugman, 2000; Bernanke, 2013), 1 and various lending and bank balance
sheet measures. I use the summation of the reserve balance and monetary base to measure
the balance sheet size of the Federal Reserve Bank.2 Table 2.1 provides definitions of
candidate variables and predicted variables.
Data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, Yahoo Finance, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), and the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Following Stock
and Watson (2003a), the measures of output and inflation are, respectively, the Indus-
trial Production (IP) and the Consumer Price Index (CPI). These two objective variables
have been used widely to represent output and the price level in monthly data analysis.
The data are transformed to remove stochastic and deterministic trends. To solve this is-
sue, I treat the logarithm of output as I (1) and the logarithm of prices as I (2) following
1The Fed provided information about future monetary policy, as a policy tool, so as to influence market
expectations, which consequently move output, inflation, and unemployment (Bernanke, 2013). In this pa-
per, I consider the expectations measures of manufacturers and consumers, which are announced by OECD.
2The balance sheet measure of the Federal Reserve Bank is calculated by the summation of reserve
balance and monetary base. Since the series is not seasonally adjusted, I use the X-11 method for it.
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Table 2.1: Series Description
Label Description Source
Asset prices
FFR Interest rate: Federal Funds(effective) F
TR3M Interest rate: US Treasury bill, 3-month F
TR1Y Interest rate: US Treasury constant maturities, 1-year F
TR5Y Interest rate: US Treasury constant maturities, 5-year F
TR10Y Interest rate: US Treasury constant maturities, 10-year F
Aaa Moody’s seasoned Aaa long term corporate bond yield F
Baa Moody’s seasoned Baa long term corporate bond yield F
TRSPT The spread: 10YTR-3MTR F
TRSPO The spread: 10YTR-1YTR F
CPSP The spread: Baa-10YTR F
DFSP The spread: Baa-Aaa F
STOCK S&P’s common stock price index: composite Y
EXTN United States; effective nominal exchange rate B
EXTR United States; effective real exchange rate B
Money and Lendings
MB Monetary base (sa) F
M1 M1 money stock (sa) F
M2 M2 money stock (sa) F
RMB Real monetary base (sa) F
RM1 Real M1 money stock (sa) F
RM2 Real M2 money stock (sa) F
FBS Monetary base+reserve balance (nsa) F
RFBS Real FBS (nsa) F
BCR Bank Credit, all commercial banks (sa) B
LLB Loans and leases in bank credit, all commercial banks (sa) B
CCO Total consumer credit owned and securitized (sa) F
TNR Total nonrevolving credit owned and securitized (sa) F
Survey Expectations
BCI Business tendency survey: confidence, manufacturing E
BTO Business tendency survey: orders inflow, manufacturing E
BTE Business tendency survey: future employment tendency, manufacturing E
CCI Consumer opinion survey: confidence E
Leading indicators
CLI Composite leading indicators E
Real Activity
IP Industrial production total (sa) F
Price
CPI Consumer price index: all urban consumers (sa) F
Notes: Sources are abbreviated as follows: the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (F), the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors (B), Yahoo finance (Y), the OECD (E), and the BIS (B). All data
except the exchange rate (EXT) start in January 1960 and ends in July 2015. The exchange rate
(EXT) starts in January 1964.
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Table 2.2: Unit Root Test Results
Variable Transformation p-value Variable Transformation p-value
FFR lev 0.08 RM1 ln 0.98
FFR 1d 0 RM1 ln1d 0.01
TR3M lev 0.2 RM1 ln2d 0
TR3M 1d 0 RM2 ln 0.93
TR1Y lev 0.39 RM2 ln1d 0
TR1Y 1d 0 RM2 ln2d 0
TR5Y lev 0.46 FBS ln 1
TR5Y 1d 0 FBS ln1d 0
TR10Y lev 0.68 FBS ln2d 0
TR10Y 1d 0 RFBS ln 1
Aaa lev 0.54 RFBS ln1d 0
Aaa 1d 0 RFBS ln2d 0
Baa lev 0.58 BCR ln 0.18
Baa 1d 0 BCR ln1d 0
TRSPT lev 0 BCR ln2d 0
TRSPO lev 0 LLB ln 0.09
CPSP lev 0.02 LLB ln1d 0
DFSP lev 0.02 LLB ln2d 0
STOCK ln 0.93 CCO ln 0.54
STOCK dln 0 CCO ln1d 0
EXTN ln 0.35 CCO ln2d 0
EXTN ln1d 0 TNR ln 0.77
EXTR ln 0.26 TNR ln1d 0
EXTR ln1d 0 TNR ln2d 0
MB ln 1 BCI lev 0
MB ln1d 0 BTO lev 0
MB ln2d 0 BTE lev 0
M1 ln 0.96 CCI lev 0.02
M1 lnd1 0.01 CCI 1d 0
M1 lnd2 0 CLI lev 0
M2 ln 0.39 CLI 1d 0
M2 ln1d 0.01 IP ln 0.24
M2 ln2d 0 IP ln1d 0
RMB ln 1 CPI ln 0.37
RMB ln1d 0 CPI ln1d 0.08
RMB ln2d 0 CPI ln2d 0
Notes: The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test is implemented. Transformation label: lev=level
(no transformation), 1d=first difference, ln=logarithm, ln1d=first difference of logarithm, and
ln2d=second difference of logarithm. Test type: drift. The number of lags in the ADF test is deter-
mined by the AIC, where the maximum lag length is 19 (the default number of lags in Eviews).
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Stock and Watson (2003a). The unit root test results of variables are displayed in Table
2.2. I define : yht+h = (1200/h)ln(IPt+h/IPt) and yt = 1200ln(IPt/IPt−1) for the In-
dustrial Production; yht+h = (1200/h)ln(CPIt+h/CPIt) − 1200ln(CPIt/CPIt−1) and
yt = 1200ln(CPIt/CPIt−1) − 1200ln(CPIt−1/CPIt−2) for inflation, where h is the
forecasting horizon.
2.2 Model
This study focuses on the multi-step pseudo out-of-sample forecasting performance
for the short term (h = 1) and the medium term (h = 12). The forecasting models are:
• Bivariate Forecast: yBIt+h = βh0 + βh1 (L)xt + βh2 (L)yt + t+h, t = 1, 2, ..., T, (1)
• Autoregressive Forecast: yARt+h = γh0 + γh1 (L)yt + ηt+h, t = 1, 2, ..., T, (2)
where βh1 (L)xt =
∑p
j=1 β
h
1jxt−j+1, β
h
2 (L)yt =
∑q
j=1 β
h
2jyt−j+1, γ
h
1 (L)yt =
∑q
j=1 γ
h
1jyt−j+1,
and T is the sample size used for estimating equations (1) and (2). Equation (1) is the can-
didate model, where yht+h is the h-period-ahead predicted variable, and xt is a candidate
variable. Equation (2) specifies the benchmark model. The lag orders are selected by BIC
criteria from the ranges 1 ≤ p, q ≤ 12. The lag length is chosen through the rolling lag
selection. The lag length (q) in the AR model is determined continuously, and then length
(p) in the bivariate model is also selected each time. In the process, the lag length (q) in
Equations (1) and (2) are the same, but the lag lengths (p and q) in the models are up-
dated each time. This lag selection would improve forecasting accuracy better than the lag
selection using full sample estimation when there is at least one structural break.
I consider the pseudo out-of-sample estimation and a rolling window forecast. Com-
pared to the in-sample estimation, the pseudo out-of-sample estimation could work bet-
ter when there are structural changes over time (Diebold et al., 1995). Additionally, the
pseudo out-of-sample estimation is a more realistic approach because it evaluates the fore-
casting accuracy based on the assumption that we were actually there for forecasting the
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future using available information at that time.
This study uses a 60-month (m = 60) rolling window to capture the features of the
local forecasting performance. If the number of observations is too small, it is hard to
calculate the test statistics. On the other hand, if it is too large, it is hard to capture the
local forecasting performance. I also verify the robustness with a different choice of the
window size (m = 120) in a later section.
To calculate the time variation in the relative performance, the h-step ahead relative
mean squared forecast error (rMSFE) is defined as:
rMSFEt =
1
m
t+m/2−1∑
j=t−m/2
ˆ2j+h −
j=t+m/2−1∑
j=t−m/2
ηˆ2j+h
 , t = R + h+m/2, ..., T −m/2 + 1,
(3)
where R is an in-sample portion, and ˆt+h and ηˆt+h are pseudo out-of-sample forecast
errors of Equations (1) and (2), respectively. The number of the in-sample portion (R =
120) and the size of the rolling window (m = 60) are chosen to include a sufficient number
of rMSFEs for identifying the relative forecasting performance during the sample period.
2.3 Statistical test
I use the Fluctuation test proposed by Giacomini and Rossi (2010). Compared to the
Diebold-Mariaon test (Diebold et al., 1995), which is based on average performance over
time, the Fluctuation test provides the local forecasting performance over time. Therefore,
we can distinguish the relative forecasting performance of various indicators during the
Great Recession.
The unconditional predictive test (Diebold et al., 1995; Clark and West, 2006) evalu-
ates average performance of the models over the out-of-sample period. On the other hand,
the conditional predictive test includes practical testing environments. For example, Gia-
comini and White (2006) consider that last period information could help explain relative
16
predictive ability of the next period between the two models. Second, Giacomini and Rossi
(2010) suggest tests for evaluating the relative performance of the models when the rela-
tive performance is changing. This study investigates the relative forecasting performance
of indicators over time focusing on the time after the Great Recession began. Hence, in
this study, I consider the Fluctuation test.
The Fluctuation test measures the local relative forecasting performance over rolling
out-of-sample windows of size m. The null hypothesis is that the models’ forecasting
performances are the same at each point in time.
H0 : E
(
ˆ2t − ηˆ2t
)
= 0, t = R + h, ..., T −m/2 + 1. (4)
The test statistic is defined as:
FOOSt,m = σˆ
−1m−1/2 ×
t+m/2−1∑
j=t−m/2
ˆ2j+h −
t+m/2−1∑
j=t−m/2
ηˆ2j+h
 , (5)
for t = R+h+m/2, ..., T −m/2+1, where σˆ2 is a Heteroskedasticy and Autocorrelation
Consistent (HAC) estimator of the asymptotic variance σ2 = var
(
P−1/2
∑T
j=R+h
(
2j − η2j
))
,
where P is an out-of-sample portion, and P = T −R. Following Newey and West (1987),
HAC standard error is,
σˆ2 =
q(P )−1∑
i=−q(P )+1
(1− |i/q(P )|)P−1 ×
T+m/2−1∑
j=R+h
(
ˆ2j − ηˆ2j
) (
ˆ2j−i − ηˆ2j−i
)
, (6)
where q(p) is a bandwidth, and we use q(P ) = P 1/4.
Asymptotic critical values for various choices of the window and sample sizes are
provided by Giacomini and Rossi (2010). The ratio between the rolling window and
the out-of-sample portion is about 0.1 (m/P'0.1) in the paper. Therefore, the null hy-
pothesis is rejected against the two-sided alternative at the 10% significance level when
maxt|FOOSt,m | > 3.170 .
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2.4 Estimation results
This section shows the short-term and medium-term forecasting performance of the
candidate variables for output and inflation changes. The tables summarize the relative
mean square forecast errors (rMSFEs) and p-values based on the full out-of-sample period
for h = 1 and 12, respectively. When h = 1, the pseudo out-of-sample estimation starts in
April 1970 and ends in July 2015, but the nominal and real exchange rates start in April
1974 and end in July 2015. When h = 12, the out-of-sample period starts in March 1971
and ends in July 2015, but the nominal and real exchange rates start in March 1975 and
end in July 2015. The graphs show the Fluctuation tests. At h = 1 the starting point is
October 1972 and the ending point is February 2013 except for the exchange rates. The
exchange rates begin in October 1976 and end in February 2013. At h = 12, the starting
point is September 1973, and the ending point is February 2013. The exchange rates start
in September 1976 and end in February 2013.
The predictive content of financial condition measures for output increased signifi-
cantly at h = 1 and for inflation change at h = 12. Therefore, this section focuses on the
two cases.3 This result suggests that the predictive contents of the variables are different
by a dependent variable and a forecasting period, and financial condition measures are
useful indicators for output in the short term and for inflation change in the medium term.
2.4.1 Forecasting Industrial Production Growth
In Table 2.3, the third column reports rMSFEs over the full out-of-sample period, and
the fourth column provides p-values. The p-values are calculated based on the uncondi-
tional Giacomini and White (2006) test. A negative value indicates that a candidate vari-
able provides additional forecasting information because an rMSFE is defined as Equation
(3).
3The results for output at h = 12 and for inflation change at h = 1 are in the Online-Appendix.
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Table 2.3: Forecasting IP Growth for h = 1 (m = 60, Rolling lag selection)
Variable Trans rMSFE p-value Variable Trans rMSFE p-value
MB ln1d -0.45 0.65 BTE level -1.21 0.23
M1 ln1d 0.84 0.4 CCI level -1.31 0.19
M2 ln1d 0.71 0.48 CLI level -1.33 0.18
RMB ln1d 1.42 0.16 CPI 1200*ln2d 1.25 0.21
RM1 ln1d 0.46 0.65 FBS ln1d 0.81 0.42
RM2 ln1d -1.54 0.12 RFBS ln1d 0.92 0.36
BCR ln1d -0.01 1 MB ln2d 1.12 0.26
LLB ln1d 1.46 0.14 M1 ln2d 1.18 0.24
CCO ln1d -0.55 0.58 M2 ln2d 1.43 0.15
TNR ln1d 1.3 0.19 FFR level -1.31 0.19
FFR 1d -0.05 0.96 3MTR level -0.7 0.48
3MTR 1d -0.67 0.5 1YTR level -0.46 0.65
1YTR 1d -1.44 0.15 5YTR level 0.01 0.99
5YTR 1d -1.7 0.09 10YTR level 0.24 0.81
10YTR 1d -1.83 0.07 Aaa level 0.66 0.51
Aaa 1d 0.85 0.4 Baa level 0.58 0.56
Baa 1d 0.74 0.46 TRSPT level -0.43 0.67
TRSPT 1d 1.12 0.26 TRSPO level -0.64 0.52
TRSPO 1d 0.89 0.37 CPSP level -0.54 0.59
CPSP 1d -1.1 0.27 DFSP level 0.07 0.95
DFSP 1d -1.39 0.16 CPI ln1d -0.26 0.79
STOCK ln1d -1.01 0.31 BCI 1d -1.16 0.25
EXTN ln1d 1.76 0.08 BTO 1d -1.54 0.12
EXTR ln1d 0.66 0.51 BTE 1d -0.17 0.87
BCI level -1.1 0.27 CCI 1d -1.33 0.18
BTO level -2.88 0 CLI 1d -2.83 0
Notes: The rMSFE and p-value are calculated over the full out-of-sample period. A negative value
of rMSFE indicates that the suggested model predicts better than the benchmark model.
At h = 1, many indicators show negative rMFSEs. For example, the government secu-
rity rates, credit spreads, stock price, money aggregates, and market expectation measure
report negative rMSFEs over time. We can reject the null hypotheses of the long-term
interest rates, exchange rate, market expectation measure at the 10% significance level.
However, a negative rMSFE value of an indicator does not necessarily mean that a p-value
of the indicator is low because forecast errors and coefficients of explanatory variables
could change over time.
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Figure 2.1: Forecasting IP at 1 Month Horizon (Rolling lag selection, h = 1 and m = 60)
Credit spread Stock price
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
The Fluctuation tests represented in Figure 2.1 show a different aspect of forecasting
performance. The rMSFEs and p-values previously mentioned report the forecasting per-
formance on average, which includes the whole sample period, but I can distinguish the
local performance of indicators over time using the Fluctuation test. Before the crisis, the
credit spread and stock price had not predicted output and inflation better than the bench-
mark model. During the crisis, however, the credit spread and stock price significantly
outperformed the benchmark model following the crisis declined quickly.4
2.4.2 Forecasting Inflation Change
This section focuses on the forecasting performance of indicators for inflation change.
Table 5 displays the medium-term predictive ability of indicators for the full out-of-sample
period. Most of the indicators show negative rMSFEs. We can reject the null hypothesis
of the credit spread, money aggregates, balance sheet measure, and government security
4The results of the other variables are in the Online-Appendix.
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interest rates at the 10% significance level.
Table 2.4: Forecasting Inflation Change for h = 12 (m = 60, Rolling lag selection)
Variable Trans rMSFE p-value Variable Trans rMSFE p-value
MB ln1d 1.90 0.06 BTE level -0.81 0.42
M1 ln1d -0.80 0.42 CCI level -0.92 0.36
M2 ln1d -0.41 0.68 CLI level -0.59 0.55
RMB ln1d -0.56 0.58 IP 1200*ln1d -0.55 0.58
RM1 ln1d -0.92 0.36 FBS ln1d 1.88 0.06
RM2 ln1d -2.18 0.03 RFBS ln1d -0.40 0.69
BCR ln1d 0.38 0.70 MB ln2d 0.29 0.77
LLB ln1d -0.73 0.47 M1 ln2d 0.38 0.71
CCO ln1d -0.39 0.69 M2 ln2d 0.65 0.52
TNR ln1d 1.01 0.31 FFR level -1.77 0.08
FFR 1d 0.07 0.95 3MTR level -1.71 0.09
3MTR 1d -1.13 0.26 1YTR level -1.34 0.18
1YTR 1d -0.33 0.74 5YTR level -0.58 0.56
5YTR 1d -0.17 0.87 10YTR level -0.75 0.45
10YTR 1d 0.33 0.74 Aaa level -0.38 0.71
Aaa 1d 0.29 0.77 Baa level -0.22 0.83
Baa 1d -1.70 0.09 TRSPT level -0.89 0.37
TRSPT 1d -0.16 0.87 TRSPO level -0.71 0.48
TRSPO 1d -0.37 0.71 CPSP level 1.72 0.09
CPSP 1d -1.37 0.17 DFSP level 0.11 0.91
DFSP 1d -1.87 0.06 BCI 1d -2.26 0.02
STOCK ln1d -0.62 0.54 BTO 1d -0.70 0.48
EXTN ln1d -0.69 0.49 BTE 1d -1.33 0.18
EXTR ln1d -0.99 0.32 CCI 1d 1.03 0.30
BCI level -1.21 0.23 CLI 1d -1.75 0.08
BTO level -1.28 0.20
Notes: The rMSFE and p-value are calculated over the full out-of-sample period. A negative value
of rMSFE indicates that the suggested model predicts better than the benchmark model.
Table 2.4 displays the medium-term predictive ability of indicators for the full out-
of-sample period. Most of the indicators show negative rMSFEs. We can reject the null
hypothesis of the credit spread, money aggregates, balance sheet measure, and government
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security interest rates at the 10% significance level.
Figure 2.2: Forecasting Inflation at 12 Month Horizon (Rolling lag selection, h = 12 and m = 60)
Credit spread Stock price
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
Figure 2.2 presents the Fluctuation test for forecasting medium-term inflation change.
The predictive ability of stock price significantly increased during the crisis.
2.4.3 The Performance of Indicators in the Great Recession
During the Great Recession, significant improvement was seen in the forecasting per-
formance of the credit spread, stock price, and market expectation measures. This esti-
mation result is consistent with the idea that the Great Recession was mainly driven by
a financial shock (Ng and Wright, 2013), and financial market conditions are important
factors in the business cycle (Bernanke et al., 1999; Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012).
During the crisis, not only worsened economic conditions but also the declines in home
prices and stock prices influenced consumption and investment of households and firms
negatively. Due to the decrease in assets and worsened condition of borrowers’ balance
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sheets, market conditions for secured loans and rollover of short-term debt deteriorated
(Acharya et al., 2011). To address the financial crisis, the Fed bought a large amount
of long-term Treasury bonds and agency securities to provide liquidity in the market.
This policy, as well as a “flight-to-quality” buying by private investors, lowered the long-
term government bond rates and stock price (Friedman and Kuttner, 1993; Gagnon et al.,
2011). However, the corporate bond rates did not decline as much as the long-term gov-
ernment bond rates due to the fire sales by market participants who were afraid of the
credit risk, liquidity risk, and collateral liquidation by the lender (Shleifer and Vishny,
2011). Also, market expectations declined significantly more than previous recessionary
periods. Therefore, the worsened financial market condition and reverse wealth effect
affected the consumption and investment of households and firms negatively, and these re-
duced consumption and investment exacerbated the economy through financial accelerator
mechanism.
However, as the financial conditions improved, investors and financial institutions
managed their portfolios to include corporate bonds and other risky assets to maximize
their capital gains. Consequently, the forecasting performance of financial market condi-
tion declined after the Great Recession. To summarize, the forecasting performance of
financial variables are not always better than the bench mark model. The predictive ability
of specific financial variables increases significantly in a financial crisis.
2.5 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I re-estimate the predictive ability of the variables for robustness checks:
different window size, fixed lag selection, real-time forecasting, and the Great Depression
data.
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2.5.1 Different window size (m = 120)
I recalculate the Fluctuation tests using a different window size (m = 120). The ra-
tio between the rolling window and the out-of-sample portion is about 0.2 (m/P'0.2).
Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected against the two-sided alternative at the 10% sig-
nificance level when maxt|FOOSt,m | > 2.948 (Giacomini and Rossi, 2010).5
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the forecasting performance of indicators for the industrial
production growth and inflation change, repectively when I use the different window size.
The forecasting performances of the credit spread and stock price increased during the
crisis, though in most cases the increase was not significant. This is because an increased
number of observations in the test statistics dilute their values and variations. However, the
forecasting performances of the credit spread for medium-term output growth and stock
price for medium-term inflation were significantly better than the benchmark model.
2.5.2 Forecasting by Fixed Lag Selection
In the previous sections, the lag length was determined by the BIC criterion using
rolling lag selection. In this section, the lag orders are selected by BIC criteria over the
full sample estimation from the ranges 1 ≤ p, q ≤ 12. The number of lag in the AR model,
q, is selected first in Equation (2) on the full sample estimation, then the number of lag in
the Bivariate model, p, is chosen on the full sample estimation in Equation (1).
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 display the Fluctuation tests when I use the fixed lag selection.
Compared to the rolling lag estimation, the credit spread failed to forecast output growth
or inflation better than the benchmark model in either the short- or medium-terms. Dur-
ing the crisis, however, the stock price outperformed the benchmark model at forecasting
5In terms of estimation period, at h = 1 the starting point is April 1975, and the ending point is August
2010 except exchange rates. In exchange rates, the starting point is April 1979, and the ending point is
August 2010. At h = 12, the starting point is March 1976, and the ending point is August 2010. In exchange
rates, it starts in March 1980, and it ends in August 2010.
24
Figure 2.3: Forecasting IP at 1 Month Horizon (Rolling lag selection, h = 1 and m = 120)
Credit spread Stock price
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
Figure 2.4: Forecasting Inflation at 12 Month Horizon (Rolling lag selection, h = 12 and m = 120)
Credit spread Stock price
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
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Figure 2.5: Forecasting IP at 1 Month Horizon (Fixed lag selection, h = 1 and m = 60)
Credit spread Stock price
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
Figure 2.6: Forecasting Inflation at 12 Month Horizon (Fixed lag selection, h = 12 and m = 60)
Credit spread Stock price
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
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output growth in the short-term and inflation in the long-term. Thus during the crisis, in
a different model specification, financial variables still contained information about the
economy. However, this result suggests that the number of lags influences the forecasting
performance of financial variables. In this study, the forecasting performance of the credit
spread is sensitive to the number of lags, and this might be one reason why forecasting the
economy is difficult, especially in a period when there is a recession or a turnaround in the
economy.
2.5.3 Real-Time Forecasting
In the previous sections, the estimation results are based on the latest-available data,
which have been revised. In practice, however, the latest-available data is not accessible to
a real-time forecaster when predicting output growth and inflation. A real-time forecaster
is only able to use real-time data. In this section, I calculate the forecasting performance
of financial variables using real-time data.
The real-time data of the industrial production index is used as a data set, and the
financial variables and unconventional monetary policy measures are used without change.
The real-time macroeconomic data comes from the Philadelphia Fed in the Real-Time
Data Set for Macroeconomists and the Bureau of Labor statistics (BLS). In regards to CPI,
the vintage data sets of CPI start in November 1998, and the revision of CPI occurs when
there is re-basing. Therefore, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, CPI data was used
with 1967 as the base year for the real-time data following Clark and McCracken (2010).
Considering the real-time data availability, this section focuses on real-time forecasting
for industrial production growth.
For estimation, the notation in Croushore (2006) is used. Equations (1) and (2) can be
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written using the data vintage, ν, as follows:
yht+h|t,ν = β0 + β1(L)xt,v + β2(L)yt,v + t+h (1
′)
yht+h|t,ν = β0 + β2(L)yt,v + ηt+h (2
′)
In this section, there are two main issues in real-time forecasting. First, in reality,
a real-time forecaster is unable to use the current month’s data for forecasting one-month
ahead due to data availability. Thus, two-month ahead real-time forecasting corresponds to
one-month ahead pseudo out-of-sample estimation. Likewise, thirteen-month ahead real-
time forecasting matches with twelve-month ahead pseudo out-of-sample forecasting.
Next, it needs to be decided what to use as the value of “actual”, yt+h. One of many
vintage data sets, such as the latest-available data or first announced data, can be used. To
imitate a real-time forecaster, I use the first preliminary estimate as the actual value for
comparison.
With respect to short-term forecasting, the pseudo out-of-sample period starts in June
1970 (announced in July 1970) and ends in June 2015 (announced in July 2015). The first
pseudo out-of-sample estimate (June 1970) is calculated using the vintage data in May
1970, which includes data until April 1970. The forecast is compared to the vintage data
in July 1970 considering a one-month delay in announcement.6 On the other hand, in
medium-term forecasting, the pseudo out-of-sample period starts in March 1972 and ends
in June 2015.
The results of real-time forecasting are consistent with the latest-available data anal-
ysis. Figure 2.7 displays the Fluctuation tests when I use the real-time data set. For
short-term output forecasting, the forecasting performances of the credit spread and stock
price improved significantly over the benchmark model. Additionally, market confidence
6The estimation for exchange rates starts in four years later.
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Figure 2.7: Forecasting IP at 1 Month Horizon (Real-time rolling lag selection, h = 1 and m = 60)
Credit spread Stock price
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
Business tendency surveys: confidence Business tendency surveys: orders inflow
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
measures, such as business tendency survey (confidence and orders inflow) also provided
predictive content of output forecasting during the recent crisis. However, in medium-term
forecasting, the four variables did not provide information about the future output growth.
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2.5.4 The Performance of Indicators during the Great Depression
In this section, I implement the Fluctuation test using a credit spread and a stock price
from January of 1919 to December of 1941 to see the performance of the indicators during
the Great Recession, especially in the banking crises.7 This is because the development
of the Great Recession is similar to the development of the Great Depression. The Great
Depression was triggered by the stock market crash after the stable growth in the 1920s,
and the Great Recession was provoked by the subprime mortgage crisis after the stable
growth in the Great Moderation period. The two contractions happened after long peri-
ods of stable growth in the 1920s and the Great Moderation, respectively (Friedman and
Schwartz, 1963; Bernanke, 2004). Since the sample is fairly small, I use a window of 50
observations (m) and an in-sample portion of 120 observations.
Figure 2.8: Forecasting IP at 1 Month Horizon in the Great Depression (Rolling lag selection, h = 1 and m
= 50)
Credit spread Stock price
Note: Negative values of the rMSFEt (solid line) indicate that the suggested model forecasts better than the
benchmark model. The shaded areas represent recessionary periods as determined by the NBER. The red
lines are 90% significance bands for the null hypothesis that the models’ relative forecasting performances
are equal.
7The data comes from Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941(Board Of Governors Of The Federal
Reserve System, U.S., 1943). The stock price in this section is the Dow-Jones Industrial stock price index.
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Figure 2.8 shows the Fluctuation tests when I used the data of the Great Depression.
Only the forecasting performance of the stock price was significant during and after the
Great Depression when h = 1. Bernanke (1983) claims that the credit spread, a nonmon-
etary policy effect, was also an important element in addition to the money stock during
the Great Depression. However, the Fluctuation test result shows that the credit spread
predicted the industrial production growth better than the AR model in the short-run, but
it was not significant at h = 1.
Compared to the Great Recession, the dominant indicator in the Great Depression was
the stock price change. This result implies that, during a financial crisis, declines of asset
prices, or increases of liquidity risk and credit risk, could happen in different kinds of asset
markets, such as stock markets, debt security markets, or housing markets. As a result, it
is hard to decide on one variable as being a universal economic indicator. However, there
are financial variables that provide information about the economy in a financial crisis.
31
3. EXAMINING THE GREAT MODERATION DURING THE GREAT RECESSION
Section 3 is organized as follows. Section 3.1 briefly provides the definitions of the
terms concerning this study. Section 3.2 describes the data. Section 3.3 shows the model
and test results. Finally, Section 3.4 reports the robustness checks.
3.1 Background
This section provides background information and the definitions of the terms in this
study. First of all, the definition of business cycles defined by Burns and Mitchell (1946)
is as follows:
Business cycles are a type of fluctuation found in the aggregate economic ac-
tivity of nations that organize their work mainly in business enterprises: a
cycle consists of expansions occurring at about the same time in many eco-
nomic activities, followed by similarly general recessions, contractions, and
revivals which merge into the expansion phase of the next cycle; this sequence
of changes is recurrent but not periodic; in duration business cycles vary from
more than one year to ten or twelve years; they are not divisible into shorter
cycles of similar character with amplitudes approximating their own.
According to this definition, expansion or contraction of the economy is determined
by the overall economic condition of the various macroeconomic variables. For example,
Kuznets (1934) used national income accounts to describe the state of the U.S. economy
for overcoming the Great Depression. Also, the National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) defines a recession as follows:
A recession is a significant decline in economic activity spread across the
economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, real
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income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales. A re-
cession begins just after the economy reaches a peak of activity and ends as
the economy reaches its trough. Between trough and peak, the economy is in
an expansion. Expansion is the normal state of the economy; most recessions
are brief and they have been rare in recent decades.
Next, the Great Moderation means the reduction in the volatilities of the macroeco-
nomic variables from the mid-1980s (Stock and Watson, 2003b). The decline in volatility
occurred across various macroeconomic variables (Stock and Watson, 2003b). Finally, the
Great Recession indicates the recent financial crisis from December 2007 to June 2009.
Its depth, duration, and dispersion of the decline in various economic measures were more
serious than any other recession after the Great Depression (1929-1939).
3.2 Data
I use a data set from FRED-QD: a quarterly database for macroeconomic research by
McCracken and Ng (2015) and Stock and Watson (2003b) to examine the characteristics
of the U.S. business cycle comprehensively. The data set consists of 261 quarterly series
from the first quarter of 1959 to the third quarter of 2015. Some variables start in different
years. The detailed description and period of the data are described in the appendix. This
data set considers the criteria of Stock and Watson (1996) following McCracken and Ng
(2015).1
FRED-QD is organized into 14 groups: (1) national income and product accounts
(NIPA), (2) industrial production, (2) employment and unemployment, (4) housing, (5)
inventories, orders, and sales, (6) prices, (7) earnings and productivity, (8) interest rates,
1The critera of Stock and Watson (1996) are as follows: First, the sample should include the main
monthly economic aggregates and coincident indicators. Second, the sample should include important lead-
ing economic indicators. Third, the sample should represent different broad classes of variables that can be
expected to have quite different time series properties. Fourth, the series should have consistent historical
definitions or, when the definitions are inconsistent, it should be possible to adjust the series with a simple
additive or multiplicative splice.
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(9) money and credit, (10) household balance sheets, (11) exchange rates, (12) other, (13)
stock markets, and (14) non-household balance sheets.
The variables are transformed by the methods in Stock and Watson (2003b) and Mc-
Cracken and Ng (2015). For example, the formula for growth rate is 100× ln(Xt/Xt−1),
the unemployment rate is transformed by Xt − Xt−1, and the personal consumption ex-
penditure is transformed by 100 × (ln(Xt/Xt−1) − ln(Xt−1/Xt−2)). The transformation
of the data are provided in the appendix.
3.3 Model and Tests
In this study, I implement tests for detecting structural breaks from 1960-2015, focus-
ing on a break around the Great Recession. Since there were two important economic
events - the Great Moderation and the Great Recession - during this period, I implement
multiple structural break tests on unconditional volatilities. First, I focus on changes in
means and then consider changes in variances for avoiding the misspecification of the
conditional mean in the models.
For the structural break point tests, I consider an AR(1) model, which is suggested by
McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000); Gadea Rivas et al. (2014). They decide the number
of lag by the Schwarz information criterion. Equation (1) considers the mean and the
autoregressive terms.
yt = µ+ ρyt−1 + εt (3.1)
where yt is a stationary dependent variable, such as growth rates or first differences, µ
is a constant term, and ρ is a coefficient of the first lag. This AR(1) model might simplify
the movements of the macroeconomic variables. However, this model could provide inter-
pretation of a conditional mean and persistence of a previous period value, and it follows
the consistent interpretation of previous literature. As a result, I use this AR(1) model in
this study.
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3.3.1 The Parameter Instability Test
I implement the parameter instability test in linear models suggested by Hansen (1992).
This test provides overall information about a structural break both in an individual param-
eter (individual Lc tests) and a set of parameters (Joint test), and the test statistic is based
on the first-order conditions of least squares and its average of the squared cumulative
sums.
Table 3.1 shows summarized test results for the 22 series in the data set. I selected
variables from the table in Stock and Watson (2003b). Detailed estimation results of the
macroeconomic variables are provided in the appendix. The Joint tests reject that there
is a parameter stability in every variables at the 5% significance level. This instability is
mainly concerned with the variances and constant terms. The null hypothesis that there
was a break in the constant term of GDP is not rejected, but the null hypothesis of durable
consumption, consumption-services, the share of inventory changes in GDP, government
spending, and services production is rejected at the 5% significance level. The null hy-
pothesis of variance stability of most variables is rejected.
The results of the data set are provided in the online-appendix. The null hypothesis
that there is no parameter change in the variances and Joint tests in the most variables of
the data set is rejected. The null hypothesis in the constant term and the first coefficient
in some variables is also rejected. The parameter instability is not concentrated on a few
groups, but it exists widely in every groups. Therefore, there is at least one widespread
instability in the economy during the sample period, and this result is still consistent with
previous literature that there is a structural break although I include the observations of the
Great Recession and its recovery.
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However, this result does not show the timing of the structural change, such as in the
Great Moderation or the Great Recession. Therefore, I use tests which show the timing of
a change in conditional means and conditional volatilities of the variables from the next
section.
3.3.2 Identifying Multiple Structural Breaks
There were at least two important economic events from 1960 to 2015, the Great Mod-
eration and the Great Recession. Therefore, I consider multiple structural breaks in mean
and volatility.
I implement the multiple structural tests suggested by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003a,b).
They consider a multiple linear regression model with m breaks (m+1 regimes).
yt = x
′
tβ + z
′
tδj + ut, t = Tj−1 + 1, ..., Tj (3.2)
for j = 1, ...,m + 1, and where yt is the dependent variable; xt(p × 1) and zt(q × 1) are
independent variables; ut is the disturbance. The break points (T1, ..., Tm) are unknown.
β is invariant, and δj (j = 1, ...,m + 1) is time-varying coefficients. When p = 0, this
equation becomes a pure structural change model where all the coefficients could change.
The variance of ut could change whenever there is a break,
In terms of the test statistics, they propose the three multiple structural breaks tests:
supF test, double maximum tests, and a test of l versus l + 1 breaks. Compared to pre-
vious tests, they consider a partial structural change model allowing serial correlation and
heteroskedasticity in the erros, trending regressors, lagged dependent variables, and dif-
ferent distributions for the errors and the regressors across segments. The estimates of the
break points is decided by global minimizers of the sum of squared residuals based on the
principle of dynamic programming.
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(Tˆ1, ..., Tˆm) = argminT1,...,TmST (T1, ..., Tm), (3.3)
where Ti − Ti−1 ≥ q.
Firstly, the null hypothesis of the supF test is that there is no structural break, and the
alternative hypothesis is that there are m = k breaks. This is a generalization of the supF
test, which is proposed by Andrews (1993). Secondly, the null hypothesis of the double
maximum tests is that there is no structural break against an unknown number of breaks.
Thirdly, the null hypothesis of supFT (l+1|l) is that there are ‘l’ breaks, and the alternative
hypothesis is that there are ‘l+1’ breaks.
Bai and Perron (2003a) recommend a useful strategy for finding structural breaks. It is
to first use the UDmax or WDmax tests (Bai and Perron, 1998) to find out whether there
is at least one break. If the tests reject the null hypothesis, then apply the supF (l + 1|l)
tests to decide multiple breaks. This is because it is difficult to reject the null hypothesis
when there are 2 changes, and the coefficients return to its originals after the second break.
In terms of the multiple structural breaks in means, I consider Equation (1), yt =
µj + ρjyt−1 + t, which allows a constant term and a coefficient of the lag time-varying,
for the tests. This is an extension of the model by McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000),
which considers a one-time break. I assume that there are 3 as a maximum number of
breaks, and a trimming () is 0.10 following Gadea Rivas et al. (2014) for a break date of
the Great Recession besides a break date of the Great Moderation. The structural break
test detects multiple structural breaks from 1965 to 2010.
For finding structural breaks in volatility, I use the test for the detection of multiple
changes in unconditional variance, which is suggested by Inclan and Tiao (1994). This
test is extended by Sansó et al. (2004) considering two cases; the failure of the assump-
tion of normal distribution in disturbances (κ1); and heteroskedastic conditional variance
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processes (κ2).
IT (κ1) = supk|
√
T/Bk| where
Ck =
k∑
t=1
ε2t
Bk =
Ck − kTCT√
ηˆt − σˆ4
ηˆt = T
−1
T∑
t=1
ε4t , σˆ
4 = T−1CT
(3.4)
IT (κ2) = supk|
√
T/Gk| where
Gk = ˆ¯ω
−1/2
4 (Ck −
k
T
CT )
(3.5)
where ˆ¯ω4 is a consistent estimator of ω4. ω4 = limT→∞E(T−1(
∑T
t=1(ε
2
t − σ2))2 < ∞,
and ω4 is the long-run fourth order moment of εt.
ωˆt =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(ε2t − σˆ2)2 +
2
T
m∑
l=1
w(l,m)
T∑
t=l+1
(ε2t − σˆ2)(ε2t−l − σˆ2) (3.6)
where w(l,m) = 1− l/(m+1), and it is a lag window. The bandwidth m could be chosen
in the method suggested by Newey and West (1994).
Additionally, I use the method in McConnell and Pérez-Quirós (2000) and Bai and
Perron (2003a), which utilize the absolute value of the residuals assuming a normal distri-
bution of residuals, for the multiple structural break tests.
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3.3.2.1 Multiple Structural Breaks in Mean
In this section, I focus on the multiple structural breaks in means. I first consider
the representative variables, which I consider in the previous section. I then consider the
various variables in the data set.
Table 3.2 shows the results of the multiple structural break tests, and Table 3.3 dis-
plays estimated conditional means with structural breaks. Each column shows the test
statistics and critical values at the 5% significance level, and break dates are estimated by
the strategy, which is suggested by Bai and Perron (2003a).
First, in Table 3.2, the GDP growth rate does not show a structural break during the
sample period. However, consumption, consumption-services, residential, exports, im-
ports, production-nondurable goods, production-durable goods, production-services, and
90-day T-bill rate show at least one structural break before the crisis. Consumption-
services and residential show two structural breaks, and production-services show three
structural breaks. However, only the structural breaks of consumption, consumption-
services, residential, and production-services happened after the Great Moderation began
in the mid-1980s.
The timing of a structural break of the consumption, consumption-services, residential,
and production services happened before and during the Great Recession. The constant
terms became smaller and the coefficients of the first lag became larger in consumption,
consumption-services, production-services. As a result, the growth rates of those variables
are predicted to be lower than before when a previous quarter growth rate is low. However,
the slow recovery of the overall economy, GDP, is not related with a structural break by
this empirical evidence. This result suggests that declined previous growth rates are the
main source of present state of the economy.
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Table 3.3: Estimated Conditional Means
Series µj φj Break Dates
GDP 0.50 0.33
Consumption 0.68, 0.15, 0.23, 0.58 2006Q4
Consumption–durables 1.37 −0.06
Consumption–nondurables 0.49 0.18
Consumption–services 1.09, 0.62, 0.13, 0.05, 0.27, 0.72 1973Q1, 1999Q4
Investment (total) 0.72 0.19
Fixed investment–total 0.39 0.57
Nonresidential 0.46 0.58
Residential 0.25,−0.01, 1.65, 0.37, 0.80,−0.25 1981Q1, 2009Q2
∆ (inventory investment)/GDP 0.20 0.60
Exports 2.28, 0.94 −0.54, 0.30 1972Q3
Imports 2.11, 0.78 −0.35, 0.41 1974Q3
Government spending 1.26, 0.43,−0.23 0.06, 0.04, 0.32 1967Q1, 2009Q4
Production
Goods (total) 0.86 0.06
Nondurable goods 0.48, 0.81, 0.24,−0.27 1974Q4
Durable goods 1.50, 0.82, −0.30, 0.27 1972Q1
Services 1.50, 0.65, 0.77, 0.15 −0.30, 0.13,−0.28, 0.43 1969Q2, 2000Q2, 2006Q4
Structures 0.22 0.35
Nonagricultural employment 0.07 0.82
Price inflation (GDP deflator) 0.00 −0.27
90-day T-bill rate 0.09,−0.04, 0.08, 0.51 1982Q2
10-year T-bond rate −0.01 0.23
Notes: The model is yt = µj + φjyt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2t ) for j=1, 2, 3.
The results for the data set are summarized in the online-appendix. The table shows
that there is a widespread instability in the mean. The Sequential test rejects the null
hypothesis that there is no break in the mean in the eighty-seven variables of the two
hundred and sixty-one variables, but the break dates are various by series.
In the group of employment and unemployment, the null hypothesis that there was no
42
structural break in the mean in the number of total nonfarm employee is not rejected, but
the null of the number of service-providing industries, financial activities, and professional
& business services are rejected. In the group of earnings and productivity, real average
hourly earnings variables and real output per hour do not show a structural break around
the Great Recession. But, there is a structural break in real compensation per hour in
nonfarm business sector and business sector during the Great Recession, and it shows a
decline of the growth rates. In the group of money and credits, real M1 shows a radical
increase on the constant term and a decline in the coefficient of the first lag in the third
quarter of 2008, but real M2 shows no structural break during the Great Recession although
there were quantitative easing policies. The null of the mean of the real estate loans by all
commercial banks in the fourth quarter of 2006 and liabilities of households and nonprofit
organizations relative to disposable income in the first quarter of 2008 is rejected.
3.3.2.2 Multiple Structural Breaks in Volatility
In this section, I implement the multiple structural breaks in volatility using the multi-
ple structural breaks of the means in the previous section.
Table 3.4 reports the results of multiple structural break tests and Table 3.5 displays
estimated conditional volatilities of the representative variables. Each column shows the
break dates by the each test at the 5% significance level in Table 6. The null hypothesis
that there is no structural break in the volatilites of the most variables is rejected. The
timing of the structural breaks of the variables are not associated with the Great Recession
in most cases. The breaks are mainly concentrated in the 1980s. Only the break dates of
consumption-durables, production-structures, price inflation, and T-bill rate fall between
the third quarter of 2006 and the second quarter of 2011. Also, conditional volatilities of
the variables except price inflation are still low even after the Great Recession happened.
With respect to price inflation, the volatilities increased in the third quarter of 2006 by
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IT (κ1) and IT (κ2) tests. However, the multiple structural break test indicates that the
volatility of prince inflation declined in the second quarter of 1985. This is accountable
for the recent low inflation contrary to the previous moderate inflation because the recent
variance becomes larger, when there is no change in the mean of the inflation.
Table 3.4: Multiple Structural Break Tests in Conditional Volatities
Series ICSS algorithm Bai-Perron
IT (κ1) IT (κ2)
GDP 1984Q1 1984Q1 1984Q1
Consumption 1992Q1 1992Q1 1992Q1
Consumption–durables 1988Q1 1988Q1 1991Q1, 2009Q4
Consumption–nondurables 1980Q1
Consumption–services 1992Q1 1992Q1 1993Q3
Investment (total) 1984Q1 1984Q1 1984Q1
Fixed investment–total 1983Q4 1983Q4 1983Q4
Nonresidential
Residential 1983Q1 1983Q1 1983Q1
∆ (inventory investment)/GDP 1988Q1 1988Q1 1988Q1
Exports 1978Q2 1978Q2 1978Q4
Imports 1985Q4 1985Q4 1986Q2
Government spending 2002Q2 2002Q2 1987Q1
Production
Goods (total) 1984Q1 1984Q1 1984Q1
Nondurable goods
Durable goods 1983Q4 1983Q4 1983Q4
Services 1969Q1, 1998Q2 1969Q1, 1998Q2 1969Q1, 1998Q2
Structures 1974Q2, 1983Q3, 2007Q3, 2011Q2 1974Q2, 1983Q3
Nonagricultural employment 1974Q3, 1983Q4 1983Q4 1983Q4
Price inflation (GDP deflator) 1970Q2, 1985Q2, 2006Q3 1985Q2, 2006Q3 1970Q2, 1985Q2
90-day T-bill rate 1970Q3, 1979Q3, 1984Q4 1984Q4, 2009Q1
10-year T-bond rate 1966Q2, 1969Q3,1987Q4 1966Q2, 1979Q3, 1986Q2
Notes: The model is yt = µj + φjyt−1 + εt for j = 1, 2, 3, εt ∼ N(0, σ2j′), j′ = 1, 2, 3 using
the identified mean changes in Table 3.3. Bai-Perron indicates the multiple structural break tests
(Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003a,b). For IT tests, I use the quadratic spectral window with automatic
bandwidth selection.
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The results for the data set are summarized in the appendix. The table reports that there
is an extensive instability in the volatility. The IT (κ1), IT (κ2), and Bai-Perron’s multiple
structural break tests reject the null hypothesis that there is no break in the volatility in the
one hundered and seventy-six, eighty-nine, and one hundred and fifty-one variables of the
two hundred and sixty-one variables, respectively. An increase or a decrease in a volatility
are different by variable, but the most variables show declines in volatilities.
In the group of industrial production, the break dates of the most variables are con-
centrated in the 1980s, and the declined volatilities after the break dates are remained un-
changed during the Great Recession. In the group of housing, most of the variables show
at least one structural break, and volatilities increased around the beginning of the Great
Recession. This evidence shows the serious impact of the Great Recession on the housing
market. Most of the earnings and productivity variables show declines in volatilities except
unit labor cost variables, and many interest rate variables also show declines in volatilities.
But, real estate loans, real total assets of households and nonprofit organizations, real net
worth of households and nonprofit organizations, and net worth of households and non-
profit organizations relative to disposable personal income display increased volatilities
from the late 1990s.
To summarize, the volatilities in the variables of national income and product accounts
(NIPA) have been low since the Great Moderation began. This result suggest that the low
variance of the overall economy is present. However, there are increased volatilities in
housing, credit, and balance sheets of households and nonprofit organizations, which were
related with the credit expansion, from the late 1990s in the economy.
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3.3.3 A Structural Break in the Great Recession
In the previous sections, I tested multiple structural breaks in the means and volatilities,
found the breaks, and estimated the conditional means and volatilities. In this section, I
analyze the breaks and changes in the means and volatilities of the variables focusing on
the period of the Great Recession. First, I focus on the volatilities and growth rates of the
national income and product accounts variables, and I consider the volatilities and growth
rates of selected macroeconomic variables, which could be associated with the structural
changes of the national income and product accounts variables during and before the Great
Recession.
The previous result shows that the increased volatility of the economy during the Great
Recession was temporary because the null hypothesis that there was no a structural break
in the volatilities of most variables was not rejected. Therefore, the volatility of the econ-
omy is still low, and the Great Moderation is not over in the U.S. economy.
However, a structural break after the Great Recession ended cannot be detected be-
cause the number of observations is not enough. Therefore, this research cannot explain
the characteristics of the economy directly after the Great Recession ended, but the volatil-
ity of the economy after the Great Recession ended has been as low as the period of the
Great Moderation. Therefore, this empirical evidence suggests that the volatility of the
current economy is low.
In regards to the growth rates of macroeconomic variables, there was no structural
break in GDP before or during the Great Recession. However, there was a structural break
in consumption in the third quarter of 2006. Consumption’s constant term declined, and
the coefficient of the first lag increased. Consumption-services and production-services
also changed as consumption did in the fourth quarter of 1999 and the second quarter of
2009, respectively. As a result, the growth rates of those variables would be expected
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to decline when a previous growth rate was low because of the increased persistence.2
The changed coefficients of consumption could lower the growth rate of GDP because
consumption is the largest contributor to GDP.
In the national income and product accounts (NIPA), GDP is the summation of con-
sumption, investment, government spending, and net exports by the expenditure approach.
In 2015, the proportion of consumption was about 65%, the proportion of consumption-
services to GDP was about 45%, and the proportion of consumption-services to consump-
tion was about 65%. On the other hand, the ratio of services to GDP was about 60% in
2015 by the production method, in which GDP is made up of goods, services, and struc-
tures. Figure 3.1 shows the shares of GDP and consumption by the expenditure approach,
and Figure 3.2 shows the shares of GDP by the production approach from 1960 to 2015.
These figures indicate that consumption, consumption-services, and production-services
are important components in the economy.
The decline in consumption and consumption-services could contribute to the sluggish
economic growth with other conditions remaining the same. During the Great Recession,
consumption, investment, and export declined significantly. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 display the
contributions of components to percentage change in GDP by the expenditure method and
the production method, respectively, and Table 3.6 reports the contributions of each period.
They show that only government spending and imports stabilized the economy during the
financial crisis. After the recession, however, contributions to GDP growth of government
spending and imports declined, and the contributions of consumption, investment, and
exports recovered. However, the recent contribution of consumption is weaker than the
average contribution was from the first quarter of 1960 to the third quarter of 2007.
2When a previous growth rate of consumption was higher than 1.51%, or 6.06% (annualized), a current
growth rate is higher than before the structural break. Considering the recent slow growth rate of consump-
tion, the structural change implies the low growth rate of consumption due to the decline of the constant
term and increased coefficient of the first lag.
48
Figure 3.1: Shares of Gross Domestic Product by the Expenditure Approach
Notes: Each components are measured by the expenditure method.
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Figure 3.2: Shares of Gross Domestic Product by the Production Approach
Notes: Each components are measured by the production method.
Similarly, there was a structural break in production-services in the fourth quarter of
2006. Production-services’ constant term declined significantly even though the coeffi-
cient of the first lag increased.3 The declined growth of production-services is attributable
to the current sluggish economy. Table 3.7 reports the average of each GDP component’s
contributions to the GDP growth rate by the major type of production method in different
time periods. This analysis suggests that the decreased growth rates of services in both
production and expenditure may be associated with the sluggish economy after the Great
Recession.
3When a previous growth rate of production-services was higher than 0.87%, or 3.48% (annualized), a
current growth rate is higher than before the structural break.
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Figure 3.3: Contributions to Percentage Change in GDP by the Expenditure Method
Notes: The component is measured by the expenditure method.
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Figure 3.3 Continued
Notes: The component is measured by the expenditure method.
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Figure 3.3 Continued
Notes: The component is measured by the expenditure method.
With respect to long-run growth-related variables, the number of total nonfarm em-
ployees and real output per hour of all persons are considered. Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show
the historical data and growth rates of total nonfarm payrolls and real output per hour of
all persons in the nonfarm business sector, respectively. Table 3.8 reports the conditional
mean changes of the variables. The null hypothesis that there was no a structural break in
the growth rate of total nonfarm employee is not rejected. Although the retirement of baby
boomers is increasing, its effect on the size of the labor force was not significant before or
during the Great Recession. The null hypotheses of real output per hour of all persons in
manufacturing, nonfarm business, and business sectors are not rejected. This result sug-
gests that declines in the number of workers and productivity were not significant before
or during the Great Recession. In the case of the productvity, there is a downward trend.
But the null is not rejected because the number of observations is not enough to detect
53
Figure 3.4: Contributions to Percentage Change in GDP by the Production Method
Notes: The component is measured by the production method.
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Figure 3.4 Continued
Notes: The component is measured by the production method.
Table 3.6: Contributions to Percentage Change in GDP by the Expenditure Method
Period Consumption Con-Services Inv. Gov. Spending Export Import
1960Q1-2015Q3 2.06 1.40 0.55 0.50 0.37 -0.47
1960Q1-2007Q3 2.24 1.54 0.62 0.60 0.37 -0.51
Great Recession -1.02 -0.14 -3.25 0.65 -0.50 1.80
2009Q3-2015Q3 1.51 0.75 1.10 -0.24 0.62 -0.81
Notes: The component is measured by the expenditure method. The Great Recession started in the
fourth quarter of 2007 and ended in the second quarter of 2009 by the National Bureau of Economic
Research.
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a break in it after the Great Recession ended. This implies that the causes of the Great
Recession might not be attributable to the changes of the long-run growth variables.
On the other hand, with respect to short-run fluctuation-related variables, or demand-
related variables, I examine real disposable income and liabilities of households and non-
profit organizations relative to personal disposable income. Figures 3.7 and 3.8 display
the historical data and growth rates of the two variables, respectively. The null hypothe-
sis of real disposable personal income is rejected in the third quarter of 2000 at the 5%
significance level. This result suggests that consumers’ purchasing power declined before
the Great Recession began. The result of liabilities of households and nonprofit organi-
zations relative to personal disposable income shows that it increased structurally from
the first quarter of 2001, and it declined from the first quarter of 2008. This suggests that
financial leveraging by private sectors might contribute the growth of the economy in the
early 2000s although the real disposable income declined, and deleveraging by private
sectors might contribute the current sluggish economy after the Great Recession happened
because of negative wealth effects and stricter screening in financial markets. The null hy-
pothesis of real total liabilities of households and nonprofit organizations is also rejected.
Both the growth rate of liabilities and the relative value of liabilities started to decline
when the Great Recession approached.
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Figure 3.5: All Employees: Total Nonfarm Payrolls
Notes: Shaded areas indicate recessionary period
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Figure 3.6: Nonfarm Business Sector: Real Output Per Hour of All Persons
Notes: Shaded areas indicate recessionary period
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Figure 3.7: Real Disposable Personal Income
Notes: Shaded areas indicate recessionary period
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Figure 3.8: Liabilities of Households and Nonprofit Organizations Relative to Personal Disposable Income
Notes: Shaded areas indicate recessionary period
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Table 3.7: Contributions to Percentage Change in GDP by the Production Method
Period Goods Services Structures
1960Q1-2015Q3 0.94 1.84 0.24
1960Q1-2007Q3 0.96 2.04 0.31
Great Recession -1.42 0.47 -1.28
2009Q3-2015Q3 1.41 0.68 0.13
Notes: The component is measured by the major type of product method. The Great Recession
started in the fourth quarter of 2007 and ended in the second quarter of 2009 by the National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Table 3.8: Estimated Conditional Means of the Selected Macroeconomic Variables
Series µj φj Break Dates
All Employees (total nonfarm) 0.07 0.82
Real Output Per Hour of All
Persons (manufacturing)
0.32 0.60
Real Output Per Hour of All
Persons (nonfarm)
0.47 0.05
Real Output Per Hour of All
Persons (business)
0.52 0.01
Real Disposable Personal
Income
0.79, 0.73 0.11,−0.37 2000Q3
Real Total Liabilities of
Households and Nonprofit
Organizations
1.15,−0.30 0.14, 0.26 2007Q4
Liabilities Relative to Personal
Disposable Income
0.35, 1.48,−1.13 −0.03,−0.17,−0.39 2001Q1, 2008Q1
Notes: The model is yt = µj + φjyt−1 + εt for j = 1, 2, 3.
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3.3.3.1 Granger Causality Test
In this section, I implement the Granger Causality test to see the predictive content of
the consumption growth for the GDP growth. 4 The Granger causality test is a statistical
hypothesis test that the lags of one time series is useful in forecasting a dependent variable.
Therefore, the Granger causality test in this section provides information about whether
the slow growth of the consumption has a predictive content for the slow growth of GDP.
However, the Granger causality does not imply that there is a causality from the regressor
to the dependent variable.
To test the null hypothesis that the growth rate of consumption does not Granger-cause
the growth rate of GDP, I use an autoregressive distributed lag model with p lags of the
growth rate of GDP and q lags of the growth rate of consumption:
yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2yt−2 + · · ·+ βpyt−p + δ1xt−1 + δ2xt−2 + · · ·+ δqxt−q, (3.7)
and the null hypothesis is
H0 : δ1 = δ1 = · · · = δq = 0, (3.8)
The numbers of lags, p and q, are chosen 4 because I use the quarterly data.5
Table 3.9 reports the Granger causality test, and Table 3.10 reports estimated coeffi-
cients. The F-statistic of the null hypothesis is 5.37 and p-value is 0.02. Therefore, The null
hypothesis is rejected at the 5% significance level. Also, the estimated coefficients imply
that the low growth rates of consumption forecast the low growth rates of GDP. Therefore,
4I also implement the Granger Causality test to see the predictive content of the government spending
growth for the GDP growth. The test result shows that the government spending does not Granger-cause the
growth rate of GDP when the number of lags is four(p-value is 0.35), and the growth rate of GDP also does
not Granger-cause the government spending growth (p-value is 0.16).
5There is no change in the result when the numbers of lags, p and q, are 1.
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the declined growth rates of consumption might imply the decline in the growth rate of
GDP in the future.
Table 3.9: Granger Causality Test
Null Hypothesis Obs F-Statistics Prob
X does not Granger Cause Y 221 5.37 0.02
Y does not Granger Cause X 221 0.29 0.59
Notes: X denotes the growth rate of consumption, and Y denotes the growth rate of GDP.
Table 3.10: Granger Causality Test-Estimated Coefficients
Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
β0 -0.05 0.09 -0.53 0.60
β1 0.11 0.06 1.96 0.05
β2 0.08 0.06 1.40 0.16
β3 -0.07 0.05 -1.31 0.19
β4 0.05 0.05 1.01 0.32
δ1 -0.06 0.07 -0.94 0.35
δ2 0.07 0.07 1.00 0.32
δ3 0.09 0.07 1.26 0.21
δ4 0.74 0.07 10.52 0.00
Notes: I use an ADL equation, yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2yt−2 + · · ·+ βpyt−p + δ1xt−1 + δ2xt−2 +
· · ·+ δqxt−q and the null hypothesis is H0 : δ1 = δ2 = · · · = δq = 0.
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3.4 Robustness Analysis
In this section, I implement robustness checks: one-time structural break tests, differ-
ent number of lags as determined by the Schwarz Information Criterion, and a simulation
method.
3.4.1 One Time Structural Break Tests
I use one-time structural break tests, the approach used by McConnell and Pérez-
Quirós (2000). By using the one-time structural break tests when data includes obser-
vations from 2000, this section shows whether observing the early 2000s, the Great Re-
cession, and its recovery altered the timing of the Great Moderation.
I implement the one-time structural break tests suggested by Andrews (1993); Andrews
and Ploberger (1994), and I use critical values suggested by Hansen (2000). The Sup,
Exp, and Ave test statistics provide the date of the break point, which maximizes the test
statistics.
Andrews (1993) suggests the function Fn(T ) as follows:
sup
T1≤T≤T2
Fn = supFn(T ) (4.9)
In this test, n is the number of observations, and T, which maximizes the Fn(T ), is
the estimated break point. Andrews and Ploberger (1994) propose two test statistics as
follows:
expFn = ln(1/(T2 − T1 + 1))×
T2∑
T=T1
exp(
1
2
× Fn(T )) (4.10)
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aveFn = (1/(T2 − T1 + 1))×
T2∑
T=T1
Fn(T ) (4.11)
3.4.1.1 A Structural Break in Mean
Table 3.11 shows the results of the tests. The test shows when a structural break test
happens, but it does not provide the timings of both changes in means and volatilties
at the same time. Therefore, I consider changes in means and then estimate changes in
volatilities using the changes in means. I use a trimming parameter of  = 0.10.
The timing of a break point in a mean is decided by the significance level of less than
5%. I use a break point of the joint stability test following McConnell and Pérez-Quirós
(2000). For example, in GDP-consumption, I consider the fourth quarter of 2006, and the
date of the individual stability test is close to the date of the Joint test.
The null hypothesis that there was no a structural break in the mean in GDP is not
rejected at the 5% significance level, but the null hypothesis of consumption, consumption-
services, exports, government spending, production-services, and compensation per hour
is rejected at the 5% significance level. However, the timings of the break are different
by the variables. The timings of consumption, consumption-services, exports, production-
services, and compensation per hour are before the financial crisis, and the timing of the
government spending is the second quarter of 2009.
With respect to the means, these results imply that the Great Recession influenced
mainly consumption of GDP, especially service industry, and the means of many economic
activity measures, such as the production-services, and compensation per hour, already
changed before the financial crisis happened.
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3.4.1.2 A Structural Break in Volatility
In this section, I implement one time structural break tests. The equation for the tests
are as follows:
yt = µ+ ρyt−1 + t (4.12)√
pi
2
|ˆt| = α1D1t + α2D2t + ut (4.13)
D1t =
 1 if t ≤ T0 if t > T

D2t =
 0 if t ≤ T1 if t > T

The test for a break is a test of the null hypothesis of α1 = α2. When εt follows a
normal distribution,
√
pi
2
|εˆt| is an unbiased estimator of the standard deviation of ε because
of the half-normal distribution, and it can be expressed as follows:
√
pi
2
|εˆt| = α + t.
The one-time structural break test statistics suggested by Andrews (1993); Andrews and
Ploberger (1994), and critical values in Hansen (2000) are used.
Table 3.12 displays the test results of the selected macroeconomic time series. The test
results confirm the decline of the conditional volatilities in the various macroeconomic
variables when the Great Recession’s observations are included. However, the timings of
a break date are delayed due to the Great Recession in consumptions, the share of inventory
changes in GDP, exports, and 90-day T-bill rate. Therefore, the Great Recession did not
structurally increase the volatilities of various macroeconomic variables.
However, there are mean changes in the macroeconomic variables in the previous sec-
tion. Therefore, I implement tests for a break in the volatility of the variables using the
67
identified conditional mean changes, which are shown in the previous section. For a mean
change, I estimate:
yt = µ1D1 + µtD2 + φ1yt−1D1 + φ2yt−1D2 + εt (4.14)
D1t =
 1 if t ≤ κ0 if t > κ

D2t =
 0 if t ≤ κ1 if t > κ

whereD1 andD2 are dummy variables. I use this equation from McConnell and Pérez-
Quirós (2000). I consider a Joint break in the constant and the AR coefficient.
Table 3.13 shows the results of the one time structural break tests in volatility using
the identified break in means. It also shows that the Great Recession did not increase
the volatilities structurally. The Great Recession delayed a one time break date of several
macroeconomic variables, such as consumption-durables, consumption-nondurables, etc,
of which break dates were earlier before the Great Recession happened.
The one-time structural break tests show that the volatilities of macroeconomic vari-
ables increased temporarily at the beginning of the Great Recession, but the growth rates
of several macroeconomic variables declined structurally.
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Table 3.12: One Time Structural Break Tests in Conditional Volatilities
Series Break Date Sup Exp Ave
GDP 1984Q2 10.47(0.04) 2.94(0.02) 3.87(0.01)
Consumption 2010Q1 8.76(0.10) 2.42(0.03) 3.56(0.02)
Consumption–durables 2009Q4 19.76(0.00) 5.18(0.00) 3.68(0.01)
Consumption–nondurables 2009Q2 4.91(0.47) 0.67(0.38) 1.02(0.35)
Consumption–services 1987Q1 3.65(0.70) 0.76(0.33) 1.13(0.29)
Investment (total) 1984Q1 7.21(0.19) 1.91(0.06) 2.76(0.04)
Fixed investment–total 1983Q4 3.84(0.67) 0.61(0.43) 0.93(0.39)
Nonresidential 1966Q4 1.23(1.00) 0.13(1.00) 0.24(0.98)
Residential 1983Q3 7.51(0.17) 1.59(0.09) 1.97(0.10)
∆ (inventory investment)/GDP 2010Q1 9.57(0.07) 2.12(0.05) 2.81(0.04)
Exports 2009Q4 13.67(0.01) 4.54(0.00) 7.53(0.00)
Imports 1991Q2 11.21(0.03) 4.06(0.00) 5.84(0.00)
Government spending 1967Q2 3.54(0.73) 1.06(0.20) 1.97(0.10)
Production
Goods (total) 1984Q1 7.17(0.20) 1.45(0.11) 1.72(0.13)
Nondurable goods 1971Q1 5.06(0.45) 0.71(0.36) 0.95(0.38)
Durable goods 1985Q1 9.02(0.09) 2.89(0.02) 4.69(0.00)
Services 1985Q3 5.77(0.34) 1.77(0.07) 2.93(0.03)
Structures 1984Q2 4.97(0.46) 0.94(0.24) 1.35(0.22)
Nonagricultural employment 2010Q1 6.75(0.23) 1.04(0.21) 1.40(0.20)
Price inflation (GDP deflator) 1985Q2 6.09(0.30) 1.30(0.14) 1.80(0.12)
90-day T-bill rate 2009Q3 29.91(0.00) 10.94(0.00) 5.70(0.00)
10-year T-bond rate 1965Q4 33.43(0.00) 12.09(0.00) 4.22(0.01)
Notes: I test the one time structural break tests based on Andrews (1993) and Andrews and
Ploberger (1994). The model is yt = µ+ φyt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2t ) where σ2t = σ21 if t ≤ T and
σ2t = σ
2
2 if t > T .“Sup,” “Exp”, and “Ave” indicate the supremum, exponential, and average test
statistics. The values in parentheses are p-values.
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Table 3.13: One Time Structural Break Tests in Conditional Volatilities Using an Identified Break in Con-
ditional Means
Series Break Date Sup Exp Ave
GDP 1984Q2 10.47(0.04) 2.94(0.02) 3.87(0.01)
Consumption 1992Q1 10.74(0.04) 3.23(0.01) 4.52(0.00)
Consumption–durables 2009Q4 19.76(0.00) 5.18(0.00) 3.68(0.01)
Consumption–nondurables 2009Q2 4.91(0.47) 0.67(0.38) 1.02(0.35)
Consumption–services 2000Q3 30.10(0.00) 9.89(0.00) 2.38(0.06)
Investment (total) 1984Q1 7.21(0.19) 1.91(0.06) 2.76(0.04)
Fixed investment–total 1983Q4 3.84(0.67) 0.61(0.43) 0.93(0.39)
Nonresidential 1966Q4 1.23(1.00) 0.13(1.00) 0.24(0.98)
Residential 1983Q3 7.51(0.17) 1.59(0.09) 1.97(0.10)
∆ (inventory investment)/GDP 2010Q1 9.57(0.07) 2.12(0.05) 2.81(0.04)
Exports 2010Q1 31.43(0.00) 11.09(0.00) 11.48(0.00)
Imports 1991Q2 11.21(0.03) 4.06(0.00) 5.84(0.00)
Government spending 2009Q1 8.46(0.11) 2.14(0.05) 3.62(0.01)
Production
Goods (total) 1984Q1 7.17(0.20) 1.45(0.11) 1.72(0.13)
Nondurable goods 1971Q1 5.06(0.45) 0.71(0.36) 0.95(0.38)
Durable goods 1985Q1 9.02(0.09) 2.89(0.02) 4.69(0.00)
Services 2000Q3 18.63(0.00) 4.21(0.00) 3.13(0.03)
Structures 1984Q2 4.97(0.46) 0.94(0.24) 1.35(0.22)
Nonagricultural employment 2010Q1 6.75(0.23) 1.04(0.21) 1.40(0.20)
Price inflation (GDP deflator) 1985Q2 6.09(0.30) 1.30(0.14) 1.80(0.12)
90-day T-bill rate 2009Q3 29.91(0.00) 10.94(0.00) 5.70(0.00)
10-year T-bond rate 1965Q4 33.43(0.00) 12.09(0.00) 4.22(0.01)
Notes: I test the one time structural break tests based on Andrews (1993) and Andrews and
Ploberger (1994). The model is yt = µj + φjyt−1 + εt, εt ∼ N(0, σ2t ) where µj = µ1 and
φj = φ1if t ≤ κ and µj = µ2 and φj = φ2 if t > κ and σ2t = σ21 if t ≤ T and σ2t = σ22 if t > T .
κ is chosen by the Joint test. “Sup,” “Exp”, and “Ave” indicate the supremum, exponential, and
average test statistics. The values in parentheses are p-values.
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3.4.2 Different Number of Lags: The Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC)
In this section, I use the Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) to decide the number of
lags, and I consider GDP and the five main components of GDP, consumption, investment,
government spending, and net exports (exports and imports). The lag orders are selected
by the SIC from the ranges 1 ≤ p ≤ 4. Among those variables, the number of lags in
investment, exports, and imports are one as determined by the SIC. Therefore, I reestimate
the structural breaks in GDP, consumption, and government spending in this section.
Tables 3.14 and 3.15 show the structural break tests on the conditional means and
volatilities of the variables, respectively, and Table 3.16 shows the estimated conditional
volatilities. The results are consistent with the previous results. The null hypothesis that
there was no structural break in the conditional means is not rejected, but the null hypoth-
esis that there was no structural break in the conditional volatilities is rejected only during
the period of the Great Moderation. Therefore, this evidence also shows that the increased
volatility in the economy during the Great Recession was temporary, and the Great Mod-
eration has not ended because the conditional volatilities of the variables have declined
since the end of the Great Recession.
In the previous section, the model specification is the AR (1) in consumption, and there
was a structural break before the Great Recession happened. In this section, however, it
is the AR (2), and there was no structural break in consumption when I used the SIC
lag selection. Therefore, in the case of a structural break test for a conditional mean, a
test result might be different depending on a model specification. However, there was no
structural break in conditional volatilities of the variables in this section, too. Thus, the
results in this section also suggest that the increased volatility during the Great Recession
was temporary, and the Great Moderation is not over.
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Table 3.15: Multiple Structural Break Tests in Conditional Volatilities of the Components of GDP
Series ICSS algorithm Bai-Perron
IT (κ1) IT (κ2)
GDP 1983Q2 1983Q2 1984Q1
Consumption 1992Q1 1983Q2 1992Q1
Government spending 1986Q4 1967Q2, 1989Q2 1967Q2, 2001Q4
Notes: The model is yt = µj + φ1jyt−1 + φ2jyt−2 + φ3jyt−3 + φ4jyt−4 + εt, j = 1, 2, 3,
εt ∼ N(0, σ2j′), j′ = 1, 2, 3. The number of lags is decided by the SIC. The number of lags in
GDP, consumption, and government spending is 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Bai-Perron indicates the
multiple structural break tests (Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003a,b). For IT tests, I use the quadratic
spectral window with automatic bandwidth selection.
Table 3.16: Estimated Conditional Volatilities of the Components of GDP
Series IT(κ1) IT(κ2) Bai-Perron
ε2t Break Dates ε
2
t Break Dates ε
2
t Break Dates
GDP 1.01, 0.53 1983Q2 1.02, 0.55 1984Q1 1.02, 0.55 1984Q1
Consumption 0.74, 0.38 1992Q1 0.78, 0.45 1983Q2 0.74, 0.38 1992Q1
Government spending 1.09, 0.69 1986Q4 1.44, 0.93, 0.68 1967Q2, 1989Q2 1.44, 0.87, 0.58 1967Q2, 2001Q4
Notes: The model is yt = µj + φ1jyt−1 + φ2jyt−2 + φ3jyt−3 + φ4jyt−4 + εt, j = 1, 2, 3,
εt ∼ N(0, σ2j′), j′ = 1, 2, 3. The number of lags is decided by the SIC. The number of lags in
GDP, consumption, and government spending is 2, 3, and 4, respectively
3.4.3 Simulating the Recent Economy for the Structural Break Test
The data set includes a small number of observations from after the Great Recession
began in the fourth quarter of 2008 according to the NBER business cycle date. Because it
has only been a few years since the end of the recession, the number of observations during
and after the Great Recession is only twenty-seven. In this section, I use the simulation
method suggested by Gadea Rivas et al. (2014) to address this issue by simulating the
duration of the Great Recession and its recovery. I consider the GDP data series, use the
AR (1) model, and implement the multiple structural break tests on the conditional mean
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and variance of the GDP data.
I use the stationary bootstrap method proposed by Politis and Romano (1994). In
the procedure, a pseudo-time series is generated by resampling blocks that have different
lengths that follow a geometric distribution.6 The first simulation combines the observa-
tions of the Great Recession and its recovery, and the second simulation only uses the
observations of the recovery. I lengthen both cases by 5 years and 10 years.
In the first scenario where I enlarge the simulation by 5 years using the observations
of the Great Recession and its recovery, the null hypothesis that there was no a structural
break is rejected about 72.9% of the simulated growth rates of GDP in, most often, the first
quarter of 2006. The results of the structural break tests in the volatility were the same as
in the previous section. There was only one break around 1984 in almost all simulations.
In the second scenario where I only use the observations of the recovery, the null
hypothesis that there was no structural break of about 10.7% in the growth rates of GDP
is rejected. The timing of most breaks was also the first quarter of 2006. The results of the
structural break tests in the volatility also show that there was a structural break around
1984 in most simulations.
When I enlarge the length of both cases by 10 years, the null hypothesis that there was
no structural break in the growth rate is rejected at the 5% significance level in most sim-
ulations of both cases . The timing of the break in the first scenario was around 2006, and
the timing of the break in the second scenario was around 2000. However, both scenarios
also display that there was a structural break in the volatility of the economy around 1984.7
6I use 0.06 for the probability of the geometric distribution so that the average is 16 quaters, the average
duration of expansions following Gadea Rivas et al. (2014). I run 10,000 iterations.
7When I used the AR (2) instead of the AR (1), the null hypothesis that there was no structural break of the
growth rate of GDP is rejected about 6.7% and 49% by 5 years and 10 years, respectively, in the first scenario.
The null hypothesis is rejected about 5.2% and 32% by 5 years and 10 years, respectively, in the second
scenario. However, the test detects a structural break in the volatility only around 1984 in most of both cases.
With respect to consumption in the AR (1) model, the null hypothesis of most simulated conditional means
is rejected around the start of the Great Recession, and the null hypothesis of most simulated conditional
volatilities is rejected in the early 1990s.
74
The two simulation scenarios suggest that the Great Recession and its recovery could
influence the growth rates of GDP if the current sluggish economy continues or another
financial crisis happens, but the Great Moderation is not over.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the first essay, I evaluated the local forecasting performances of financial variables
and financial condition measures for output growth and inflation before, during, and after
the Great Recession. The empirical evidence suggests that financial condition measures
had the predictive content for output growth and inflation change during the Great Reces-
sion.
Compared to previous recessionary periods, financial market condition measures be-
came important indicators for the economy during the Great Recession. For example, the
credit spread and stock price forecasted output and inflation better than the benchmark
model during the Great Recession. Also playing an important role during the financial cri-
sis were market confidence measures. These results suggest that the Great Recession was
primarily driven by a financial shock, which is unlike those of previous recessions, which
were usually supply or monetary policy shocks (Ng and Wright, 2013). Also, the results
are consistent with the idea that the financial condition is important in the business cycle
(Bernanke et al., 1999; Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012). Finally, a real-time forecaster was
able to predict output growth using real-time data. Therefore, the real-time data analysis
was consistent with the latest available data analysis during the Great Recession.
Whether the predictive ability of the credit spread, stock price, and market sentiment
measures will increase in future recessions depends on the kind of shock and the type of
recession in the economy. However, the extremely low short-term interest rate and zero
lower bound constraint could occur again in the coming years due to the sluggish economy
and recent low interest rate trends. Therefore, the unconventional monetary policy may be
considered more often in the future to deal with a recession. In this situation, financial
condition measures might be useful indicators for investors and central bankers, and it is
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important that financial market conditions are not exacerbated by an economic shock to
prevent a serious recession.
In the second essay, I investigated the characterization of the U.S. business cycle, fo-
cusing on the Great Recession. I implemented the multiple structural break tests on the
conditional means and the volatilities of the various macroeconomic variables in a reduced
model to find any changes in the variables around the Great Recession.
This study shows that the increase of the volatility in the economy during the Great
Recession was temporary, and the low volatility of the economy is still present today.
Therefore, the Great Moderation still holds in the U.S. business cycle. Also, there was
no structural break in the growth rate of GDP, but there was a structural break before or
during the Great Recession in the growth rates of consumption, consumption-services,
and production-services, which compose major parts of the economy, and there was also
a structural break in real disposable income and liabilities of consumers, which are asso-
ciated with consumption and demand. Therefore, the recent sluggish economy might be
related with the low volatility of the economy and the recent low growth rates in consump-
tion. Finally, the empirical evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of active monetary
policy for sustaining a stable economy beyond the short-run, which many policy makers
and researchers supported during the Great Moderation.
The multiple structural break tests in this study cannot detect changes after the Great
Recession ended because the number of observations after the Great Recession ended is
small. Therefore, the detected structural breaks cannot be directly accountable for the
recent sluggish economy. However, the simulation result suggests that a structural break
in the growth rate of GDP might have occurred before the Great Recession if the recent
sluggish economy continues, and there was no structural break in the volatility around the
Great Recession. Therefore, policy for improving the economy, especially consumption,
might be necessary to avoid a structural decline in the growth rate of the economy.
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APPENDIX A
DATA DESCRIPTION OF THE SECOND ESSAY
The data was obtained from FRED-QD at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The
transformation codes (TCODE) are as follows: (1) no transformation; (2) ∆xt; (3) ∆2xt;
(4) log(xt); (5) ∆log(xt); (6) ∆2log(xt); and (7) ∆(xt/xt−1 − 1.0).
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Table A.15: Series Period
Series Period|| Series Period
GDPC96 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NDMANEMP 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PCECC96 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USCONS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PCDGx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USEHS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PCESVx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USFIRE 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PCNDx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USINFO 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
GPDIC96 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USPBS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
FPIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USLAH 1960:02 - 2015:Q3
Y033RC1Q027SBEAx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USSERV 1987:02 - 2015:Q3
PNFIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USMINE 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PRFIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USTPU 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
A014RE1Q156NBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USGOVT 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
GCEC96 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USTRADE 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
A823RL1Q225SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 USWTRADE 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
FGRECPTx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CES9091000001 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
SLCEx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CES9092000001 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
EXPGSC96 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CES9093000001 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IMPGSC96 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CE16OV 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DPIC96 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CIVPART 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
OUTNFB 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UNRATE 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
OUTBS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UNRATESTx 1960:Q3 - 2015:Q3
OUTMS 1987:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UNRATELTx 1987:Q3 - 2015:Q3
INDPRO 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 LNS14000012 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPFINAL 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 LNS14000025 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPCONGD 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 LNS14000026 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPMAT 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UEMPLT5 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPDMAT 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UEMP5TO14 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPNMAT 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UEMP15T26 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPDCONGD 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UEMP27OV 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPB51110SQ 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 LNS13023621 1967:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPNCONGD 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 LNS13023557 1967:Q1 - 2015:Q3
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Table A.15 Continued
Series Period|| Series Period
IPBUSEQ 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 LNS13023705 1967:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPB51220SQ 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 LNS13023569 1967:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TCU 1967:Q1 - 2015:Q3 LNS12032194 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
CUMFNS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 HOABS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PAYEMS 1987:Q1 - 2015:Q3 HOAMS 1987:Q1 - 2015:Q3
USPRIV 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 HOANBS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
MANEMP 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 AWHMAN 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
SRVPRD 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 AWHNONAG 1964:Q1 - 2015:Q3
USGOOD 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 AWOTMAN 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DMANEMP 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 HWIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q1
HOUST 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CPIAUCSL 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
HOUST5F 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CPILFESL 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PERMIT 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 PPIFGS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
HOUSTMW 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 PPIACO 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
HOUSTNE 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 PPIFCG 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
HOUSTS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 PPIFCF 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
HOUSTW 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 PPIIDC 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
CMRMTSPLx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 PPIITM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
RSAFSx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NAPMPRI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
AMDMNOx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 WPU0531 1967:Q1 - 2015:Q3
ACOGNOx 1992:Q1 - 2015:Q3 WPU0561 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
AMDMUOx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 OILPRICEx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
ANDENOx 1968:Q1 - 2015:Q3 AHETPIx 1964:Q1 - 2015:Q3
NAPMSDI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CES2000000008x 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
INVCQRMTSPL 1967:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CES3000000008x 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PCECTPI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 COMPRMS 1987:Q1 - 2015:Q3
PCEPILFE 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 COMPRNFB 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
GDPCTPI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 RCPHBS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
GPDICTPI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 OPHMFG 1987:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPDBS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 OPHNFB 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
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Table A.15 Continued
Series Period|| Series Period
DGDSRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 OPHPBS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DDURRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 ULCBS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DSERRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 ULCMFG 1987:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DNDGRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 ULCNFB 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DHCERG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UNLPNBS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DMOTRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 FEDFUNDS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DFDHRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 TB3MS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DREQRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 TB6MS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DODGRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 MED3 1971:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DFXARG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 GS1 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DCLORG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 GS10 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DGOERG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 MORTG 1971:Q2 - 2015:Q3
DONGRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 AAA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DHUTRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 BAA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DHLCRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 BAA10YM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DTRSRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 MORTG10YRx 1971:Q2 - 2015:Q3
DRCARG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 TB6M3Mx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DFSARG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 GS1TB3Mx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DIFSRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 GS10TB3Mx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DOTSRG3Q086SBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CPF3MTB3Mx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
MED3TB3Mx 1971:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NAPMPI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
AMBSLREALx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 UEMPMEAN 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IMFSLx 1980:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CES0600000007 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
M1REALx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NAPMEI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
M2REALx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NAPM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
MZMREALx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NAPMNOI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
BUSLOANSx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NAPMII 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
CONSUMERx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 TOTRESNS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
NONREVSLx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NONBORRES 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
REALLNx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 GS5 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
116
Table A.15 Continued
Series Period Series Period
REVOLSLx 1968:Q1 - 2015:Q3 TB3SMFFM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TOTALSLx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 T5YFFM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
DRIWCIL 1982:Q2 - 2015:Q3 AAAFFM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TABSHNOx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 PPICRM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TLBSHNOx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 PPICMM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
LIABPIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 CPIAPPSL 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TNWBSHNOx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 CPITRNSL 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
NWPIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 CPIMEDSL 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TARESAx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 CUSR0000SAC 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
HNOREMQ027Sx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 CUUR0000SAD 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TFAABSHNOx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 CUSR0000SAS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
VXOCLSX 1962:Q3 - 2015:Q3 CPIULFSL 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
USSTHPI 1975:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CUUR0000SA0L2 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
SPCS10RSA 1987:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CUSR0000SA0L5 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
SPCS20RSA 2000:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CES0600000008 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TWEXMMTH 1973:Q1 - 2015:Q3 DTCOLNVHFNM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
EXUSEU 1999:Q1 - 2015:Q3 DTCTHFNM 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
EXSZUSx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 INVEST 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
EXJPUSx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 HWIURATIO 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q1
EXUSUKx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CLAIMSx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
EXCAUSx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 BUSINVx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
UMCSENTx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 ISRATIOx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
USEPUINDXM 1985:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CONSPI 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
B020RE1Q156NBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CP3M 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
B021RE1Q156NBEA 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 COMPAPFF 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
GFDEGDQ188S 1966:Q1 - 2015:Q2 PERMITNE 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
GFDEBTNx 1966:Q1 - 2015:Q2 PERMITMW 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPMANSICS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 PERMITS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPB51222S 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 PERMITW 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
IPFUELS 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3 NIKKEI225 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
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NASDAQCOM 1971:Q1 - 2015:Q3 CNCFx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
CUSR0000SEHC 1982:Q4 - 2015:Q3 S&P 500 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TLBSNNCBx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 S&P: indust 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TLBSNNCBBDIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 S&P div yield 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TTAABSNNCBx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 S&P PE ratio 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2
TNWMVBSNNCBx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 GDPG 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TNWMVBSNNCBBDIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 GDPNG 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
NNBTILQ027Sx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 GDPD 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
NNBTASQ027Sx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 GDPSV 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TNWBSNNBx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2 GDPST 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q3
TNWBSNNBBDIx 1960:Q1 - 2015:Q2
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